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The New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme: A step in the right 
direction? 
 
David Bullock 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the development, features, merits and likely impacts of the New 
Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (as implemented by amendments the Climate 
Change Response Act 2002). First, the paper explores the history and debate surrounding 
selection of policy instruments to reduce New Zealand’s greenhouse gas emissions with a 
particular focus on the New Zealand emissions trading scheme. Second, the paper 
describes the consultation processes that have been used in the development of the 
climate change policy in New Zealand. Third, the paper examines the sectoral 
requirements and effects of participation in the scheme and looks at the modelling of 
economic and environmental impacts that has been carried out by various organisations. 
Finally, some brief comparisons are made with schemes in other jurisdictions. 
 
Now is the time to confront this challenge once and for all. Delay is no longer an 
option. Denial is no longer an acceptable response. The stakes are too high.  
The consequences, too serious.  
 Barack Obama, addressing the Governors’ Global Climate Summit,  
November 2008. 
 
Introduction 
 
Since the late 1970s the scientific evidence that the Earth’s climate is warming as a result 
of the activities of humans has been growing. There is an overwhelming scientific 
consensus that anthropogenic climate change is occurring. What this will mean for 
humanity remains to be seen, but predictions are becoming increasingly grim.1 Leading 
members of the scientific community have stressed that in order for the mitigation of 
climate change to have the greatest chance of succeeding strong action must be taken 
with haste; they have implored the governments of the world to cooperate to reduce 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Despite this, many governments have acted hesitantly 
in the development and implementation of climate change policy. However, in recent 
years, as the scientific evidence and public awareness of the issue has grown, the resolve 
of many governments has begun to strengthen and action has followed, although often 
only modest. Even so, however, effective action has been somewhat of a rarity compared 
to the rhetoric of unrealistic and unfulfilled goals.  
 
Climate change presents the world with large, dynamic and multi-faceted issues, 
dilemmas and tradeoffs. In economic terms, climate change is a market failure of epic 
proportions. The climate itself can be described as a global ‘public good’, a good that is 
non-excludable (a person cannot be prevented from enjoying the climate if they do not 
pay) and non-rival (one person’s enjoyment of the climate does not stop others enjoying 
it). The market cannot provide a non-excludable and non-rival good adequately or 
                                                 
1 For a comprehensive synthesis of present climate science see the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007). 
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efficiently, leading to a market failure. Climate change is also an example of an 
externality problem. A negative externality is a cost that is created by a transaction but 
borne (at least in part) by third parties to that transaction (often society generally) – that is, 
the people who create the cost do not bear all of it. In the context of climate change, those 
who emit GHGs contribute to causing climate change, imposing a cost upon the world 
(both now and in the future), however, the emitters themselves do not bear the full costs 
of their actions. Because the emitter does not have to bear a significant proportion of the 
costs of their emissions, they have few incentives to reduce emissions, nor do they have 
to compensate those who suffer harm as a result of the costs (Stern, 2006). 
 
Externality problems themselves are not uncommon, indeed a creative mind can find one 
almost anywhere – a factory polluting a waterway or you neighbour’s music giving you a 
headache. These problems are often relatively easily solved, often through legal avenues 
such as the assigning of property rights, torts like private nuisance and regulation. What 
makes the externality problem created by climate change different is an issue of size and 
time frame. While externalities can often affect many people, the proportions of the 
externality created by climate change are unmatched. It is an issue that affects the entire 
planet and every person on it. No one government can solve  the problem of climate 
change in isolation. Climate change extends long into the future; there are time lags both 
in how long the climate takes to respond to emissions and how long governments and 
societies take to acknowledge the problem and then to take action. The climate change 
problem also has significant distributional complexity; while everyone is affected, not 
everyone is affected in the same way or to the same extent. The damage caused by the 
production of a tonne of GHG is independent to where it was produced (Stern, 2006). 
 
New Zealand’s record on climate change has been poor. While emissions in the European 
Community have fallen by 2.2% over the period 1990-2006, New Zealand’s emissions 
have increased by 25.7% (UNFCCC, 2008). Only five Annex 1 countries performed 
more poorly than New Zealand; it could be said that between 1990 and 2006 New 
Zealand has been a climate change leader for all the wrong reasons. It could be said that 
New Zealand has often put climate change in the ‘too-hard basket’ and claims are often 
made that effective action on climate change leads to a necessary consequence of 
economic hardship. However, over the 1990-2006 period some leading economies 
managed to reduce emissions significantly, without falling into a consequential economic 
gloom. In light of this, it is hard to escape the conclusion that New Zealand’s emissions 
have not only been excessive, but also inexcusable.  
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Table 1: Reducing or stabilising emissions has been achieved2  
Country Change in total aggregate GHG 
emissions (excluding LULUCF) 
over the period 1990-2006 
United Kingdom - 15.1% 
Sweden - 8.7% 
France - 3.5% 
The Netherlands - 2.0% 
Switzerland 1% 
Denmark 2.2% 
Japan 5.3% 
United States 14.4% 
Canada 21.7% 
Ireland 25.6% 
New Zealand 25.7% 
Australia 28.8% 
    Source: UNFCCC (2008) 
 
In late 2007 the Labour-led government signalled its intentions to establish the world’s 
first emissions trading scheme (ETS) encompassing all sectors of the economy and all six 
Kyoto gases. This intention was given expression in September 2008 through the Climate 
Change Response (Emissions Trading) Amendment Act 2008 which amended the 
Climate Change Response Act 2002 (henceforth referred to as ‘the Act’). The New 
Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZETS) is a mechanism to bring New Zealand 
closer to meeting its Kyoto obligations and any future obligations that may be taken on in 
post-2012 agreements. It operates by requiring participants to surrender an emissions unit 
for each equivalent tonne of GHG they are deemed to emit. Participants in the scheme 
will either be freely allocated units or will have to buy them on the market for emissions 
units. This has the effect of requiring emitters to bear a cost for their emissions, creating 
priced-based incentives to reduce emissions as fewer emissions leads to lower costs for 
producers. This is passed on to consumers; more emissions-intensive goods will be more 
expensive; consumers then have the incentive to move away from these goods to cheaper, 
less emissions-intensive substitutes. 
 
The reactions to the initial proposals for the scheme, and to the scheme itself have been 
varied. Some argue that the scheme does not go far enough in reducing emissions and is 
too soft on emitters. Others see the scheme as New Zealand ‘running’ before the 
international community can even ‘walk’ on climate change matters. They fear the 
scheme may have adverse economic effects if New Zealand’s competitors in international 
markets do not adopt similar policies. Some say the scheme is a good way of addressing 
the climate change problem and New Zealand’s obligations, while a few others still query 
whether there is even a problem to be addressed. 
                                                 
2 Note, this data is on a production basis only. European states import many high-emissions products. 
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This paper provides an overview of the development, details and debate surrounding the 
NZETS as established by the Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading) 
Amendment Act 2008. It explores the different views, concerns and critiques that have 
been made by various organisations, interest groups and stakeholders during the scheme’s 
development. It seeks to provide insights into why New Zealand now has an ETS, how it 
has been developed, what the scheme entails and what the prospects are for the future. 
The paper also briefly examines the nature of the NZETS in the context of the policy and 
proposals of other developed nations. 
 
Following the 2008 general election the ETS legislation was returned to select committee 
as agreed by National and ACT in their confidence and supply agreement. Both parties 
had previously argued the legislation had been rushed and insufficiently consulted upon. 
The committee’s terms of reference included consideration of: the likelihood of post-
2012 agreement, the economic impact of climate policy on New Zealand, merits of an 
adaptation approach versus a mitigation approach, the merits of a carbon tax versus an 
ETS, the timing of introduction of the scheme, and the case for greater funding and 
regulation in this area. However, this paper will focus on the period up to the 2008 
general election. 
 
The History of Climate Change Policy in New Zealand 
 
New Zealand has long portrayed itself internationally as a ‘clean and green’ country, 
where environmental issues are taken seriously. Despite this, New Zealand’s progress on 
climate change policy has been slow and hesitant at best. New Zealand’s record for 
emissions reduction policy has involved a lot of rhetoric but few major substantive 
actions (although many minor policies have been put in place). Ambitious targets have 
been set, often with little clear thought on how they were to be achieved. On the 
occasions when major emissions reduction policy has been proposed, the government of 
the day has regularly been faced with significant public opposition and co-ordinated 
lobbying from interest groups who have feared that negative economic consequences 
would result from the implementation of climate change policy. More often than not, this 
has resulted in government back-downs or short-lived policies that were soon amended 
and watered down. 
 
As a small country, New Zealand is only a very minor contributor to total global GHG 
emissions, producing approximately 0.3% of world emissions (MfE, 2007a). However, 
when adjusted for population, New Zealand ranks as the 12th highest emitter in the world 
(MfE, 2007a). This is largely as a result of New Zealand’s high use of private transport 
and a large, emissions-intensive export sector (most notably agriculture). New Zealand 
has an unusual emissions profile (see Fig. 1 and Fig. 2), with nearly 50% of emissions 
coming from agriculture, compared to 12% on average in other developed nations (MfE, 
2007a). New Zealand also has a significant renewable electricity generation capacity 
(approximately 70% of total generation) leading to New Zealand’s emissions from 
electricity generation amounting to a smaller proportion of total emissions than other 
developed nations. Over the last 20 years New Zealand’s emissions have continued to 
grow and are predicted to grow further in coming years if a ‘business-as-usual’(BAU) 
scenario is maintained (see Fig. 3).  
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Fig. 1  New Zealand’s sectoral emissions in 2005 (all figures Gg CO2-e) 
 
Source: Ministry for the Environment (2007f) 
 
 
Fig. 2  New Zealand’s Emissions by gas in 2005 (all figures Gg CO2-e) 
 
Source: Ministry for the Environment (2007f) 
 
 
Fig. 3  New Zealand’s predicted GHG emissions 1990-2050 
 
Source: Ministry for the Environment (2007a) 
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New Zealand governments have repeatedly committed to taking action on climate change, 
setting emissions reduction targets both on their own initiative and in accordance with 
international agreements. New Zealand’s history on climate change policy began near the 
end of the fourth Labour Government’s final term in August 1990. An ambitious goal 
was set of reducing net CO2 emissions by 20% from 1990 levels by 2005. Following its 
victory in the 1990 general election, the National government released a ‘Carbon Dioxide 
Reduction Action Plan’ in 1992 which retained the target set by the previous government 
(while reducing the proposed date for the reduction from 2005 to 2000) and set out 
energy efficiency and forestry initiatives to assist in achieving this goal (Boston, 2007).  
 
In 1992 New Zealand signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), the key international framework treaty for intergovernmental efforts 
to address climate change. The convention requires governments to share information on 
emissions and policies, to launch national strategies dealing with GHG emissions, to 
provide financial and technological support to developing countries and to cooperate in 
preparing for the impacts of climate change (MfE, 2005). New Zealand ratified the 
UNFCCC in 1993 and previous targets and government policies were adjusted to bring 
New Zealand’s position in line with those of other Annex I countries. The new target 
involved a reduction to 1990 levels by 2000, a significantly less demanding target than 
the bold goal of a 20% reduction on 1990 levels that had been previously proposed. At 
the time, the National government proposed a NZ$10/t carbon tax to be used to meet this 
target, but this was eventually dropped in favour of voluntary agreements from industry, 
greater monitoring of emissions, and an increase in forest planting. The government 
threatened that a carbon tax would be introduced in 1997 if (particularly industry) 
emissions were not reduced. Despite emissions continuing to rise, the government backed 
down on its threat and talk of a carbon tax was quietly dropped. 
 
In 1997 New Zealand adopted the Kyoto Protocol target of reducing emissions to 1990 
levels (on average) between 2008 and 2012; this was consistent with the trend of New 
Zealand governments setting less ambitious targets as time progressed. Kyoto was signed 
by New Zealand the following year. The Kyoto Protocol is a protocol to the UNFCCC 
that sets legally binding reduction commitments for six greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, 
methane, nitrous oxide, sulfur hexafluoride, hydrofluorocarbons, and perfluorocarbons) 
produced by Annex I countries (industrialised nations). Collectively, Annex I countries 
agreed to reduce their emissions by 5.2% from 1990 levels during the first commitment 
period (CP1), spanning 2008 to 2012.  
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Table 2: Emissions reduction targets set by various New Zealand governments 1990-1997 
Year Target 
1990 To reduce CO2 emissions by 20% from 
1990 levels by 2005. 
1992 To reduce CO2 emissions by 20% from 
1990 levels by 2000. 
1994 To reduce CO2-e emissions to 1990 levels 
by 2000. 
1997 (Kyoto target) To reduce CO2-e emission to 1990 levels 
during the first Kyoto commitment period 
(2008-2012). 
 
New Zealand ratified Kyoto in 2002 (it became operative in 2005). At this time New 
Zealand was predicted to be a net economic beneficiary during CP1 due to its forest sinks 
(MfE, 2005). The Labour-led government proposed a climate change policy package 
which contained a carbon tax (capped at $25/t) for energy, industry and transport,  
‘Negotiated Greenhouse Agreements’ for ‘at risk’ large emitters, ‘Projects to Reduce 
Emissions’ designed to provide Kyoto units to projects to encourage further emissions 
reductions, and greater funding for research into reducing agricultural emissions (MfE 
2005). A review of these policies was undertaken in 2005 following revised projections 
of New Zealand’s GHG emissions that indicated the country would fall well short of its 
Kyoto obligations. Following this, the government outlined its proposed climate change 
policy, central to which was a wide reaching carbon tax (capped at NZ$25/t) to take 
effect by the start of CP1 in 2008. The proposed carbon tax was abandoned after the 2005 
general election when the Labour-led government lost its majority support for the tax 
(neither of its two main support partners, New Zealand First and United Future, were 
willing to support the tax). Without parliamentary support for a tax, emissions trading 
was left as the only politically viable and cost-effective climate change policy option for 
the Labour-led government. 
 
Consultation with stakeholders 2000-2005 
 
The Labour-led government was involved in stakeholder consultation long before the 
Kyoto Protocol was ratified. The Ministry of Economic Development led a working 
group focused on the design of an ETS until late 2001, this included meeting with 
sectoral stakeholders. 3  Dialogue sessions were held with representatives from the 
transport and oil sectors, the waste sector, and the coal, gas and geothermal industries. 
Overall industry representatives generally favoured down-stream points of obligation 
because they argued this would have the largest incentive effect on consumers, while 
officials favoured upstream points of obligation as they incur lower administrative costs 
and still carry incentive effects for emitters passed down through prices. Representatives 
also expressed concerns about loss of international competitiveness, loss of domestic 
competitiveness (e.g. coal) and uncertainties and inaccuracies of emissions measurement. 
Similar sentiments were expressed in dialogue with stakeholders from industries that 
used GHG emitting industrial processes. These industries also favoured a greater use of 
                                                 
3 Summaries of these consultation meetings can be founds on the Ministry of Economic Development’s 
website. http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/ContentTopicSummary____16251.aspx (last accessed 14/1/09). 
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either complementary or alternative regulatory measures. In dialogue sessions with the 
waste industry there was general agreement that the best location for points of obligation 
were landfill operators. However, some questioned whether the industry would be 
responsive to an ETS given that many landfill operators had already implemented 
emissions reduction technologies and that other options such as increased recycling were 
not economically viable. In the dialogue session with stakeholders from the agriculture 
sector the majority of discussion centred on the allocation on permits, measurement 
difficulties and trade issues. 
 
In late 2001 the consultation and communications team of the Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) published the results of the consultation process it had 
undertaken on the issue of whether New Zealand should ratify the Kyoto Protocol 
(DPMC, 2002a). The consultation took the form of a representative telephone survey, 
written submissions and meetings. Many of the findings noted in the report echoed other 
consultations: concerns about costs, measurement and international competitiveness. 
According to the DPMC, stakeholders gave little clear indication as to what policies they 
preferred. However, those who did expressed a preference for a carbon tax or charge over 
an ETS because of the perceived complexities of the latter.  The report also notes that 
many smaller stakeholders (e.g. agriculture, small businesses, private individuals) lacked 
a real understanding of New Zealand’s international obligations and the issues involved 
in the consultation processes. Some Māori submitters were concerned that climate change 
policy may erode the value of past and future Treaty settlement assets and believed that 
the introduction of emissions trading did not sufficiently consider Maori spiritual values 
and cultural practices. Of the small number of submitters who discussed emissions 
trading, the majority thought that an emitter level (upstream) point of obligation was 
appropriate. Interestingly, it was typically energy sector respondents who favoured a 
higher-level point of obligation. The question how permits should be allocated under an 
ETS also received limited responses. Of those who did comment, environmental groups 
typically favoured the auctioning of permits (they saw ‘grandparenting’ of permits as 
effectively rewarding emitters), whereas energy and industry stakeholders generally 
favoured ‘grandparenting’ or ‘hybrid’ arrangements. 
 
The DPMC produced a second consultation document early in 2002 (DPMC, 2002b). 
This document was a response to the preferred policy package that had been formulated 
by the government. Unlike the previous report, it was found that many stakeholders 
appeared to understand and generally accept the direction of the policy programme. Some 
stakeholders, particularly environmental groups, were concerned that the government’s 
policy package did not do enough to reduce industry emissions, and instead relied too 
heavily on carbon sinks. Some in the business sector, on the other hand, remained 
concerned that the government was not doing enough to protect their trade 
competitiveness.  
 
Consultation with stakeholders 2006-2008 
 
In 2006 the government engaged in wide ranging public consultation on the nature of its 
policy response to climate change. This consultation involved interest groups, key 
stakeholders, scientific and economic experts and Māori. As previously mentioned, by 
this time the introduction of a carbon tax was unlikely, and officials turned their attention 
to an ETS specifically. As part of the consultation process, the government released five 
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consultation documents in December 2006 and called for submissions. The documents 
related to both climate change and energy policy under the general banner of the “Draft 
New Zealand Energy Strategy”, they were titled: 
• Measures to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions Post 2012 
• Transitional Measures for Electricity and Stationary Energy Supply 
• Sustainable Land Management and Climate Change 
• Powering Our Future – New Zealand Energy Strategy 
• New Zealand Energy Efficiency and Conservation Strategy. 
 
According to the Ministry for the Environment, the consultation process included 
approximately 50 public or multi-sector meetings, workshops and Hui, and 
approximately 100 focused stakeholder meetings. These events took place throughout the 
country, with over 4,000 people attending in total (MfE, 2007c).  
 
As part of this consultation process, 13 regional Hui were held around the country to 
provide Māori with a forum to discuss views on climate change policy and to make 
submissions on the aforementioned consultation documents. The general response from 
these Hui was that Māori recognised climate change as an important issue and that 
urgently required attention. It was emphasised that the formation of policy on climate 
change ought to take Māori values into account and ought to be consistent with the 
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. Concerns were raised that the implications of Kyoto 
for Māori land owners, particularly forest owners, had not been fully considered. Other 
concerns centred on the possible land use implications for tribes that had already settled 
with the Crown, and that ought to be entitled to ‘carbon credits’ generated from Māori 
forests (MfE, 2007d). 
 
The paper Measures to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions Post 2012 received 1,776 
submissions, 1607 of which were based on a template produced by Greenpeace Aotearoa 
New Zealand. These were treated separately for the purposes of the Ministry’s analysis. 
The paper covered a wide range of topics, but some are of particular usefulness in the 
context of the ETS. Analysis of the submissions showed that 88% generally supported the 
use of a price-based measure and 79% supported an ETS specifically (MfE, 2007e), but it 
was also considered that such measures were not sufficient on their own and needed to be 
complemented with other policy such as increased education and greater funding for 
public transport and research and development. Submissions from environmental NGOs 
tended to favour the use of an emissions charge if a trading scheme could not be set up in 
the short term. Many of the submissions from business and industry groups stated that 
they did not want to see a price-based measured used in New Zealand ahead of similar 
measures being used by New Zealand’s major trading competitors – if this condition was 
not met other measures need to be taken in order to address competitiveness-at-risk 
concerns. These submissions argued that a considerable ‘lead-in time’ would be needed 
to enable firms to gain expertise in measuring emissions. They also argued, in general, 
that all sectors needed to be included in an ETS in the long run for an equitable outcome, 
but that aviation, agriculture and trade exposed industries should be exempt in the short 
run. Most submissions thought that an ETS ought to be linked to a broad international 
market. 
 
Submissions were divided on the allocation of permits. Environmental NGOs and 
academics rejected ‘grandparenting’ of permits, typically in favour of auctioning, while 
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acknowledging that in some cases free permits would have to be allocated to 
‘competitiveness at risk’ firms. Industry and business submissions were strongly in 
favour of the allocation of free permits to ‘competitiveness at risk’ firms, and argued that 
firms that can pass on their costs should be required to purchase permits from the 
government. 
 
In late 2007 this consultation and continuing policy development culminated in the 
production of The Framework for a New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (MfE, 
2007a) and the accompanying Climate Change (Emissions Trading and Renewable 
Preferences) Bill. The Bill was split at the Committee of the Whole House stage into the 
Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading) Bill and the Electricity (Renewable 
Preferences) Amendment Bill. 
 
The Bill passed its key second reading with support from the Greens and New Zealand 
First, and was passed into law on 25 September 2008. The Greens expressed concern that 
the Bill did not go far enough, having traditionally preferred a carbon tax. However, their 
support was won with concession on a $1 billion household fund designed to reduce 
household emissions by improving insulation. 
 
Options for reducing emissions  
 
It is well recognised that voluntary measures alone are unlikely to be enough to make 
significant reductions of emissions; economic instruments are needed to provide tangible 
incentives to the market. Miliniski et al. (2008) studied the effectiveness of voluntary 
contributions to mitigating climate. Despite finding that human altruism was effective in 
some circumstances (and could be encouraged), they concluded that climate change was 
a ‘tragedy of the commons, because those who do not invest have a larger net benefit as 
they rely on others’ altruism’. There are two main options for governments seeking to use 
price-based economic instruments to reduce GHG emissions – emissions taxes or 
emissions trading schemes. These market-based instruments are typically preferred to 
more regulatory ‘command and control’ style systems because market-based instruments 
create incentives that achieve lowest total cost of abatement, even if the details of the 
costs are not explicitly known (Sin, Kerr and Hendy, 2005). The literature is divided on 
the merits of each, and the applicability of each to New Zealand has been well discussed. 
 
A tax is a traditional response to environmental externalities. A tax is designed to 
internalise the externalities (i.e. costs that are not accounted for in a good’s market price) 
created by the production (or consumption) of a good. The goal is to ensure that the 
person who creates a harm should pay for it. Obviously, once the producers of an 
environmentally unsound product are forced to bear the full costs of their activities, they 
will have incentives to reduce the environmental harm they create so as to face a lesser 
tax burden.  
 
An ETS is based on tradable permits. An acceptable total amount of GHG emissions is 
determined by a government (or the government’s international agreements) who then 
allocates, by sale or for free, permits that allow a holder to emit a proportion of that total 
amount. These permits can then be traded with other firms. This enables firms who 
reduce emissions to be able to benefit by selling excess units (and needing to buy fewer). 
Other firms may not be able to reduce their emissions, or doing so may be highly 
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expensive, therefore they must buy permits to account for their emissions. The price of 
the permits would then ideally adjust to reflect the marginal cost of reducing emissions 
(Sin, Kerr and Hendy, 2005). Both schemes must involve the monitoring of emitters in 
order to enforce compliance. The two approaches also both entail administrative costs, it 
is often argued that taxes are more administratively ‘simple’ than trading schemes as no 
permits need to be registered or traded. However, permit schemes often have a wider 
coverage than taxes. Under a tax, relief is provided most simply by providing an 
exemption to the tax, but this removes the party from the scheme. Under an ETS relief 
can be provided through the allocation of permits, enabling the party to remain in the 
scheme with reduced obligations (Sin, Kerr and Hendy, 2005). In this case incentives to 
reduce emissions remain, even if a firm is allocated units covering all of its emissions, as 
a reduction in emissions enables the firm to have excess units which can be sold. Sin, 
Kerr and Hendy (2005) found that a well functioning auctioned permit scheme is the 
exact equivalent to a tax in terms of the incidence of the costs and wealth transfers. If 
permits were not auctioned and instead simply allocated, a similar effect to a tax is still 
achieved; the allocation provides a wealth transfer and makes no change to efficiency or 
incentives to abate.  
 
Bertram and Terry (2008) argued that the NZETS is not an ETS at all, rather it is a tax 
that is payable with tradable vouchers. They assume that the NZETS lacks a ‘cap’ on 
emissions. The foundations for this assumption are questionable as while the New 
Zealand scheme does not directly provide a domestic cap, a wider international cap is 
stipulated under the Kyoto agreement for CP1 within which the NZETS operates. 
However, this cap is not an absolute limit on emissions as Annex B countries can earn 
units through Kyoto’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) or through the use of 
domestic forest carbon sinks enabling them to emit more than their aggregate cap (MfE 
2007a). 
 
Market-based measures such as a tax or trading scheme may provide the government 
with a source of revenue. Sin, Kerr and Hendy (2005) argue that revenue generated 
through climate policy should be used to reduce other taxes. They argue that revenue 
from climate policies should not be treated any differently to other sources of government 
revenue. Using this revenue to provide compensation to sectors affected by the scheme, 
or to fund other environmental policy – that is, to ‘earmark’ revenue – is also not advised. 
It is argued that using revenue to compensate sectors can reduce economic and 
environmental efficiency and that other environmental policy should be considered on its 
own merits. However, the authors note that from a political perspective it is often 
important to use at least some of the revenue generated to fund other climate and 
environmental policy. Failure to do this may cause public support for the use of the 
instrument to fall as this can give the public the perception that the instrument is merely 
being used as a revenue-gathering tool, rather than as a measure to protect the 
environment. There is also often a strong political imperative to use revenue from an ETS 
to compensate and protect particular industries, even though this may conflict with 
environmental aims.  
 
Müller (2008) notes that an aversion to earmarking is commonplace amongst treasury 
officials and economists more generally. The objections to earmarking include claims 
that it leads to a misallocation of resources, restricts budgetary control (it ties up 
government resources) and can lead to budgetary inflexibility (McCleary, 1991). Müller 
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notes that, on the contrary, earmarking can protect high-priority programs from shifting 
majorities, inefficiency and corruption, give policy stability and avoid unnecessary haggling 
over funding levels. Müller concludes that strong arguments can be made for the 
earmarking of revenue gained from climate policy. 
 
Risk is a key factor in determining the policy choice. Reducing policy uncertainty 
improves the efficiency of either option, as firms are more confident when making 
investment decisions. However, risk cannot be completely eliminated and it is important 
that the risk that remains is allocated between the relevant parties as optimally as possible. 
An over-allocation of risk to some firms will cause them to reduce investment. One 
particular cause of uncertainty in trading schemes are shocks in the market for permits 
(e.g. the price shocks seen in the current financial crisis). If a firm can spread this risk 
over time it can be reduced. The government can aid this if it enables firms to bank 
permits (Sin, Kerr and Hendy, 2005). Risk can also be spread through the ‘borrowing’ of 
permits from free allocation in future periods. 
 
Under either system there is a risk that firms will engage in strategic behaviour. This 
could take the form of strategic investment, lobbying or the misrepresentation of costs 
(Sin, Kerr and Hendy, 2005). Market dominance may also emerge under a permit system, 
where a firm uses its market power to manipulate the market for permits. However, it is 
argued that this behaviour is only likely to happen if there is no functioning international 
market. It is possible that the creation of the NZUs under the NZETS some of the large 
players in New Zealand (such as the large renewable electricity generators) may be able 
to exert some influence on the market for NZUs. Whether this will actually occur remains 
to be seen. 
 
Despite the wide-ranging analysis undertaken on both policy options, New Zealand’s 
future was largely decided in the public uproar over the proposed carbon tax in 2005. 
From a political economy perspective, a trading scheme is more likely to find favour, 
particularly in the business community. It is perceived that an ETS leaves more control in 
the hands of participants in how they meet their obligations.  The decision to use an ETS 
stemmed directly from the consultation process undertaken in 2006. According to the 
government, this process concluded that and ETS offered the ‘most flexible, effective, 
fairest, and least-cost option to reducing New Zealand’s greenhouse gas emissions’, it 
was also the option most favoured by submitters (MfE, 2007b). The government 
described a tax as a ‘blunt instrument that would require regular alteration to ensure its 
effectiveness and to keep it in line with international emissions prices’ (MfE, 2007a). It is 
interesting to note that the two parties on the opposite ends of the political spectrum, the 
ACT party and the Green party, both favoured a carbon tax over an ETS. The Greens saw 
as tax a more environmentally effective while ACT saw a tax as a lower-cost option as it 
was perceived to require less administration. 
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Table 3: Comparison of different policy options for reducing emissions 
 Advantages Disadvantages 
Tax Tax level isolated from market shocks (it is set 
independently of market pressures). 
 
Relatively simple administration, mechanisms 
already exist for collecting taxes.  
 
Low compliance costs; participants do not need 
to buy units. 
 
Can be more widely applicable directly; rather 
than focusing on a few points of obligation, a tax 
can be applied to products at the point of sale.  
 
Revenue fro m a tax can be recycled into other 
environmental or economic programmes. 
Vulnerable to political manipulation, 
particularly a reduction in the tax rate. 
 
Taxes are often politically unpopular. 
 
Examples of overseas policies favour 
emissions trading which may make a tax 
difficult to link internationally.  
 
Monitoring required for compliance. 
 
Do not automatically adjust to inflation or 
external economic shocks. 
 
No set amount of reductions or emissions. 
ETS In theory leads to emissions reductions where 
abatement costs are lowest and the price of 
permits ideally adjusts to the marginal cost of 
abatement. 
 
Firms can have partial obligations which 
continue to provide incentives to reduce 
emissions.  
 
Seen as a ‘market-based solution to a market-
based problem’, this flexibility is appealing to the 
private sector. 
 
Greater ability to be linked internationally than a 
tax.  
 
Capped systems can ensure a certain 
environmental outcome by fixing the amount of 
emissions allowed.  
 
The ‘grandfathering’ of units mean a lower cost 
for participants than under a tax system.  
Effectiveness is dependant of the price of 
units. Price shocks or over-allocation may 
undermine the effectiveness of a scheme. 
 
Fluctuating and unstable unit markets 
create uncertainty for participants. 
 
Monitoring required for compliance. 
Participants must source units to pay for 
their emissions, increasing transaction, 
search and compliance costs. 
 
Vulnerable to strategic behaviour by firms 
and traders. 
Voluntary 
schemes 
Low cost and administratively simple. The 
government may want to run public information 
campaigns but does not need to collect a tax or 
units and it does not need to enforce accurate 
monitoring of emissions 
 
Low compliance costs, participants do not need 
to pay a tax, surrender units or accurately 
monitor emissions. 
 
Does not require coercive action by the 
government. 
Free-rider problems; people have 
incentives not to participate. Coordination 
problems exist in organising collective 
action. These problems lead to low 
participation and limited effectiveness of 
voluntary schemes. 
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The Climate Change (Emissions Trading and Renewable Preference) Bill 
 
The Climate Change (Emissions Trading and Renewable Preference) Bill (later called the 
Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading) Amendment Bill) set out the framework 
for the NZETS. The main framework of the scheme was set out in the new Parts 4 and 5 
of the Climate Change Response Act 2002. Part 4 outlined the general framework of the 
scheme while Part 5 gave sector specific details. Subpart 1 of Part 4 detailed the identity 
and obligations of participants in the scheme; participants (either mandatory or voluntary) 
were defined on the basis of the particular activity they were engaged in (Schedule 3 and 
Schedule 4). Subpart 2 of Part 4 established a policy for the issuance and allocation of 
NZUs by the government. Part 4, subpart 3 set out the function and responsibilities of the 
chief executive administering the scheme. Part 4 subparts 4, 5, and 6 dealt with offences 
and penalties, review and appeal provisions and miscellaneous provisions respectively. 
Part 5 of the Bill set out sector specific provisions for forestry, liquid fossil fuels, 
stationary energy and agriculture. These focused on sector specific obligations and 
exemptions. Part 5 also included transitional provisions. 
 
The Bill had a number of key features (MfE, 2007): 
 An obligation on participants to hold units matching their emissions. 
 The inclusion of all major sectors and Kyoto gases. 
 A staggered entry of sectors so that all sectors would have entered the scheme by 
2013. 
 The devolution to landowners of both the credits for afforestation activities (for 
post 1989 forests) and the liabilities for the release of CO2 through harvesting and 
deforestation. 
 Units will be held by three groups – a) those with obligations to surrender units, b) 
those who receive freely allocated units or those who receive units for eligible 
afforestation, and c) those who engage in trading activities. 
 NZUs were to be the primary unit of trade and would be fully backed and 
comparable with Kyoto units during CP1.  
 Penalties for non-compliance 
 Adaptability with potential post-2012 international agreements. 
 Free allocation of units 
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Select Committee 
 
The Bill was sent to the Finance and exprenditure committee for consideration in 
September 2008. The committee received 259 submissions from a wide range of 
stakeholders and heard 161 of these submitters in hearings held in Auckland, Wellington 
and Christchurch.  For this matter, the Finance and Expenditure Select Committee was 
comprised 5 Labour MPs, 3 National MPs, 1 Green MP, 1 Maori Party MP, 1 ACT MP, 1 
United Future MP and 1 New Zealand First MP. The membership of the committee 
consisted of: 
 Charles Chauvel (Chairperson) – Labour 
 Hon Bill English – National 
 Jeanette Fitzsimons – Green 
 Hon David Carter (replaced Craig Foss) – Labour 
 Hon Mark Gosche – Labour 
 Hone Harawira – Maori 
 Rodney Hide – ACT 
 Moana Mackey – Labour 
 Dr the Hon Lockwood Smith (Deputy Chairperson) – National 
 Hon Paul Swain – Labour 
 Hon Dr Nick Smith (replaced Chris Tremain) – National 
 Judy Turner – United Future 
 R Doug Woolerton – New Zealand First 
 
The Committee’s report was detailed and many issues were discussed. It is not necessary 
to comprehensively cover the select committee’s findings here.  However some points of 
particular salience are noted below. The most notable controversial issues included: 
 At what stage agriculture and liquid fossil fuels should enter the scheme? 
 The free allocation of units – what process, how many units, to whom, and for 
how long? 
 International linkages and the use international units.  
 Pre-1990 forest arrangements 
 
The report noted that many submitters thought the NZETS was moving ahead of the rest 
of the world, not in line with it, and that this may put trade competitiveness at risk. The 
committee responded that the NZETS was consistent with the initial design of the 
Australian scheme, that Annex 1 countries that do not include all sectors in their scheme 
must still be the costs they create (this is often covered in other ways, for example, high 
petrol taxes in Europe) and that the NZETS reflected New Zealand’s unique emissions 
profile. 
 
The committee favoured a staggered introduction of sectors as proposed in the Bill. Of 
note, the majority of the committee agree with the government’s suggestion that the 
introduction of the liquid fuels sector should be delayed from 2009 to 2011 due to an 
uncertain economic climate and domestic inflationary pressures. This justification was 
weak. Climate change policy must have a long-term focus; if it is watered down to ease 
short-term political pressures it may jeopardise the policy’s effectiveness. This decision 
was founded on the high price of oil at the time. However, since the bill was passed the 
international price of oil has fallen significantly (from approximately US$140 in July 
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2008 to US$40 in February 2009). Undoubtedly economic uncertainties, high prices and 
inflationary pressures will reoccur after 2011 – this move suggests that the government 
may be willing to ease climate policy when economic times are tough. This can be further 
illustrated by the terms of reference of the Emissions Trading Scheme Review Committee 
for their 2009 review of the ETS legislation. The terms of reference ask the Committee to 
assess the impacts of the ETS on the New Zealand economy and households while 
‘having regard to the weak state of the economy’.4 Furthermore, this sends a message to 
powerful interest groups that the government will be willing to sacrifice climate policy in 
difficult circumstances, creating incentives for such interest groups to put up obstacles 
towards such policy.  
 
The committee also noted that there were competing arguments as to when the 
agriculture sector ought to be included. Arguments for early inclusion were for the most 
part based on the fact that agriculture produces close to half of New Zealand’s GHG 
emissions. The Green party opposed a delayed entry of agriculture into the ETS. 
However, the majority of the committee decided that an early inclusion was impractical 
given monitoring difficulties and the need to finalise the allocation of units and the point 
of obligation. The committee recommended voluntary reporting for the agriculture sector 
in 2011, mandatory reporting in 2012 and obligations from 2013.  
 
The phasing out of free allocation was an issue for many submitters. The majority of the 
committee recommended delaying the phase out by five years (from 2013 to 2018). The 
Green party strongly opposed this delay. The committee rejected submissions that a price 
cap on carbon should be introduced into the scheme in order to reduce uncertainty. The 
committee found that a cap may undermine the scheme if set too low, and would be 
ineffective if set too high. It also found that a cap would be unnecessary in the scheme as 
proposed and may provide a barrier to international linkages.  
 
The committee recognised a wide range of arguments about whether international units 
should be used to meet obligations under the NZETS. The advantage of including 
international units was that it would provide a wide pool of units for participants to 
choose from, reducing their compliances costs. However, the committee recognised the 
need to preserve future international linkages and was concerned that ‘the inclusion of 
imported AAUs in the NZETS could be an obstacle in the future to linking the NZETS to 
other trading schemes that prohibit such units’. This concern particularly related to so 
called ‘hot air’ AAUs sourced mainly from Eastern European states.5 The committee 
recommended that a prohibition be placed on the use of CP1 AAUs in the NZETS during 
later commitment periods. Restrictions on the use of some0 imported AAUs were left to 
be decided in regulations. Any restrictions would not prevent participants holding 
imported AAUs, but would prevent them being surrendered to meet obligations under the 
NZETS. 
 
                                                 
4 The full terms of reference can be found at: http://www.parliament.nz/en-
NZ/SC/Details/EmissionsTrading/9/b/e/00SCETS_TOR_1-Terms-of-reference-of-the-Emissions-Trading-
Scheme-Review.htm (last accessed 14/1/09). 
5 ‘Hot air AAUs’ refer to AAUs that have been generated as a result of reduced emissions due to an 
economic recession in their country of origin. The environmental credibility of such units is often 
questionable and they are generally regarded as poor quality units.  
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The treatment of pre-1990 forests was a contentious issue. Owners opposed the 1 January 
2008 entry date for forestry arguing that the entry of forestry alone (two years before any 
other sector) placed an unjustified burden on the forestry sector and left them without 
other parties to trade units with. The question of whether indigenous pre-1990 forests 
would be included had been left open throughout the consultation processes. The select 
committee considered this matter and it was decided that there was no need to include 
pre-1990 indigenous forests as sufficient control mechanisms were already in place to 
limit deforestation of these forests. It was submitted that Māori land and land being used 
renewable generation of electricity should be exempt. However, the committee did not 
support this on the grounds that these parties ought to bear the costs of their emissions. 
 
The committee received a number of submissions on what the point of obligation ought 
to be in the agriculture sector. Arguments were made for both farm level and processor 
level points of obligation. The committee acknowledged that while a processor level 
point of obligation would be easier to implement, it was likely to be less effective in 
changing behaviour than a farm level point of obligation. The committee noted the need 
for the government to resolve at an early stage where the point of obligation would lie, by 
default it would be at a processor level but this could be changed with an order-in-council. 
While farmer-level monitoring faced technical difficulties the committee recommended 
that the Bill should include an enabling provision that would allow farmers to opt-in to a 
farm level point of obligation if it was left at the default of processor level. 
 
Minority Views 
 
Both the National Party and the Green Party contributed minority views.  The National 
Party accepted that climate change presents a significant environmental challenge and 
supported an ETS, it argued, however, that the proposed scheme did not do enough to 
protect the economy or the environment. It contended that the bill had been rushed and 
that insufficient consultation had occurred. National argued that, being only a small 
contributor to global emissions, New Zealand should not be a leader in climate change 
policy and rather it should follow the lead of other nations, particularly Australia. 
National also wanted a specific target of emissions representing a 50% reduction of 1990 
levels by 2050 to be included in the legislation. It is intriguing that National suggested 
this target, as such a target is unlikely to be achieved without New Zealand being a 
climate change leader, at least in respect of reductions in agriculture emissions. National 
opposed the government receiving over $20 billion of windfall profits from the scheme. 
However, whether such windfall profits would actually exist given the costs of free 
allocation and administration was a point of contention. As could be expected, the party 
had serious concerns about what the NZETS would mean for industry in New Zealand. It 
argued that the NZETS would create incentives for New Zealand industries to relocate 
overseas, and that more flexibility was needed in the phasing out of industry support (it 
suggested that this may need to extend beyond the 2030 deadline). National agreed that 
agriculture should be included in the scheme but it argued that the scheme did not 
provide enough incentives for farmers to reduce their emissions and that greater funding 
needed to be put into research and development. The party opposed the ‘arbitrary’ 
distinctions of forest types created via the scheme (and Kyoto) and also argued that there 
would be difficulty trading NZUs as units from forestry were not accepted in the EUETS. 
It was argued that greater protection was needed for the fishing industry and that 
refrigeration industry should be given other options to manage emissions. National 
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disagreed with the moratorium on new thermal generation and believed a better approach 
would be to provide a price signal by including electricity generation as the first sector 
with obligations in the ETS. 
 
The Green Party preferred a carbon tax to emissions trading, arguing that a tax would be 
more environmentally effective, simple and would have lower administration costs. The 
revenue generated by a tax could then be put into emissions reduction programmes. The 
Greens argued that the ETS is not a ‘cap and trade’ scheme as it lacks a cap on New 
Zealand emissions. It argued that NZUs were unnecessary and that international Kyoto 
units would be sufficient, also they feared that a future government could allocate more 
NZUs to drop their price, thereby harming those who have invested in low emissions 
technology. The party disagreed with the decision to delay the inclusion of sectors such 
as agriculture and transport into the scheme and believed that in many cases emissions 
would be ‘grandparented’ for too long. The Greens expressed concern that too many key 
features of the bill were being left to subsequent regulations, rather than being set in the 
legislation itself. The party were concerned that, initially at least, some emitters were 
bearing an inequitably great burden, while others had few or no obligations. It argued that 
the legislation did not do enough to protect regenerating indigenous forest, and that 
foresters may clear indigenous forest to plant exotic forest species, harming biodiversity.   
 
The passage of the Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading) Amendment Bill  
 
The Labour-led government alone lacked a parliamentary majority to pass the Bill into 
law. National, ACT and United Future were not willing to support the passage of the Bill 
and the government did not want to rely on the Māori Party for support. The government 
required the support of New Zealand First and the Green Party to gain sufficient numbers 
in the House. As previously mentioned, the Green Party preferred a carbon tax to an ETS, 
but was unwilling to be seen to be preventing climate change policy being enacted, so 
supported the passage of the legislation on the basis of it being better than doing nothing 
(Oliver, 2008). The Green Party also won a concession from the Labour-led government 
in the form of a 15-year NZ$1 billion household insulation fund that was to be funded 
through the profits the NZETS would provide to state owned power companies. For their 
support, New Zealand First won a number of concessions including electricity rebates 
and cash payments to those on fixed incomes to ease the effect of increased electricity 
prices under the NZETS and the free allocation of NZUs to the fishing industry to cover 
increased fuel costs. With the support of the Green Party and New Zealand First the Act 
passed its third reading (see table 4) on 9 September 2008 and was given Royal assent on 
25 September 2008.  
 
Table 4: Voting on the third reading of the Bill 
Ayes: 63 Labour 49; New Zealand First 7; Green Party 6; Progressive 1. 
Noes: 57  National 47; Māori Party 4; United Future 2; ACT 2; 
Independents: Copeland, Field. 
Source: Hansard 
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Sectoral impacts of the NZETS 
 
The various sectors of the economy all contribute to New Zealand’s emissions in 
different ways and each sector will face different challenges from participation in the 
NZETS. The NZETS is the first emissions trading scheme in the world to cover all 
sectors and all Kyoto gases. Under the 2008 legislation the introduction of sectors into 
the scheme is staggered over a five-year period, with all sectors to be included in 2013. 
The government protects some sectors once they have entered the scheme by a free 
allocation of NZUs, so such sectors will not have to bear the full costs of their emissions 
for some decades. Each major sector is treated separately by the scheme, allowing the 
differences in each to be addressed. Notwithstanding this, the Act is only a framework for 
the scheme, many technical aspects of the scheme are not specified and will be left to be 
created through regulations in the next few years (for example, the placing of points of 
obligation in the agriculture sector and developing measurement requirements for all 
sectors). 
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Table 5: Sectoral overview of the NZETS 
Sector Entry (with 
obligations) 
Point of 
obligation 
Free allocation of NZUs? 
Forestry 
Pre-1990 
1 January 2008 Land owners 
or a third 
party who has 
the decision 
to deforest. 
For pre-1990 exotic forests – 55 million 
units in total.  
Between 2008 and 2012 – 21 million 
units. 
Between 2013 and 2021 – 34 million 
units. 
Forestry 
Post-1989 
1 January 2008 Land owners, 
holders of a 
forestry right 
and lease 
holders. 
No free allocation 
Stationary 
Energy 
1 January 2010 Likely to be 
fuel suppliers 
No free allocation 
Industrial 
Processes 
1 January 2010 
 
 
Industrial 
producers 
Trade-exposed industries may receive a 
free allocation of units representing 90% 
of 2005 emissions between 2013 and 
2018. Between 2019 and 2029 the total 
number of units the Minister can allocate 
begins at eleven-twelfths of the number 
of units available for allocation in 2018. 
This then declines each year at a linear 
rate to equal one twelfth of this number 
in 2029. 
Actual allocation has yet to be 
determined for individual firms. 
Liquid Fossil 
Fuels 
1 January 2011 
(early reporting 
from 2009) 
Fuel suppliers No free allocation 
Agriculture 1 January 2013 
(early reporting 
from 2011) 
Default at be 
dairy/meat 
processors. 
Farm level 
point of 
obligation is 
also possible. 
Importers and 
manufacturers 
of synthetic 
fertiliser. 
Between 2013 and 2018 the Minister can 
allocate a total amount of NZUs 
representing 90 units for each 100 
tonnes of emissions that resulted from 
the activities 2005. 
Between 2019 and 2029 the total 
number of units the Minister can allocate 
begins at eleven-twelfths of the number 
of units available for allocation in 2018. 
This then declines each year at a linear 
rate to equal one twelfth of this number 
in 2029. 
Actual allocation yet to be determined. 
Waste and 
other 
sectors 
1 January 2013 Waste - 
Landfill 
operators 
Waste – No free allocation. 
Fisheries – Free allocation of 50% of 
2005 emissions each year between 
2011-2013 to fishing vessel operators to 
compensate for increased liquid fuel 
costs as a result of its inclusion in 2011. 
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Forestry 
 
Forestry is a relatively large contributor to the New Zealand economy. The forestry 
industry accounts for 10.4% of New Zealand’s merchandise exports, approximately 3% 
of GDP and employers some 22,500 people and as of 2007 these figures were expected to 
grow (MfE, 2007a). The inclusion of the forestry industry in the NZETS is an important 
part of New Zealand’s climate change mitigation strategy. As trees grow they absorb CO2, 
removing it from the atmosphere. The Kyoto Protocol accounts for the role forests play in 
climate change mitigation by enabling forests planted in or after 1990 (commonly 
referred to as ‘post-1989 forests’) to earn forest sink credits called ‘removal units’ 
(RMUs). Post-1989 and pre-1990 forests are treated differently under the Kyoto Protocol 
because the Protocol established targets around a 1990 base level. So called ‘Kyoto 
forests’ are forests planted on non-forest land after 1989. The amount of RMUs awarded 
are calculated by subtracting deforestation ‘emissions’ from afforestation removals, New 
Zealand is expected to be a net beneficiary in this regard and may use RMUs to offset 
other emissions.  
 
Deforestation activities are described as emitting activities for a number of reasons. First, 
the removal of a tree through deforestation prevents it from absorbing any more CO2, this 
creates emissions in a ‘removals forgone’ sense. This is compounded when the land is 
then used for other activities, especially emitting activities like agriculture. Second, wood 
that is burned releases the CO2 stored in the trees back into the atmosphere. Third, the 
harvesting process itself produces wood that is not used and is left to decay. This also 
releases the CO2 stored in the wood. Deforestation and land use change accounts for some 
20% of world GHG emissions (MfE, 2007a). 
 
Deforestation of pre-1990 exotic forests has been substantial in New Zealand, and is 
expected to increase under a BAU scenario (MfE, 2007a). It is expected that this 
deforestation may contribute 41 million tonnes of CO2 (approximately 10.5%) to New 
Zealand’s total emissions during CP1.6  Deforestation of indigenous forests has been 
much less significant, and is expected to remain low unless commercial incentives 
increase substantially.  
 
In line with the Kyoto Protocol, the NZETS also separates forests into ‘post-1989’ and 
‘pre-1990’ forests. Lough and Cameron (2008) argue that this is primarily for fiscal 
purposes, for example, awarding NZUs to activities that did not earn Kyoto units would 
come at a direct fiscal cost to the government. Pre-1990 forest owners will only have 
emissions obligations under the ETS if they engage in deforestation and convert the land 
to a new use. Owners of pre-1990 forest must report annually any deforestation that 
occurs, calculate the resulting emissions and surrender the appropriate number of units. 
Foresters who deforest their land will be exempt from obligations as long as the 
deforestation is temporary (for instance, deforestation that takes place during the 
harvesting process) and the forest is replanted in within a specified time.  Section 179(1) 
of the Act deems what activity constitutes ‘deforestation’; a hectare of land has been 
deforested if the forest on that land has been cleared, and four years after the clearing, the 
hectare has not been replanted with at least 500 stems of forest species or if no forest of 
more than 500 stems of forest species has naturally been established. The Act also 
                                                 
6 New Zealand’s total emissions during CP1 are projected to be 391.5 million tonnes of CO2-e (MfE 2008). 
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specifies that has been deforested if, 10 years after clearing, predominantly exotic forest 
species are growing, but the hectare lacks a tree crown cover comprising of at least 30% 
from trees that are 5 metres tall or higher. Indigenous forests are similarly governed but 
they have until 20 years after clearing to reach the aforementioned thresholds. The 
liability for each type of deforestation will be calculated individually, having regard to 
the age and species of the trees cleared (s179(2)). Owners of pre-1990 forests that are less 
than 50 hectares will be able to apply to be exempt from the scheme under s183, provided 
that no units have been allocated with respect to the land under s71, and all pre-1990 
forest owners will have a 2 hectare deforestation allowance for the duration of the CP1 
(and any subsequent five year period).  
 
These exemptions are deemed necessary so that compliance and administrative costs do 
not outweigh the benefits generated by the scheme (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 
2007). The chief executive of the MAF is entitled under s184 of the Act to give 
exemptions in relation to the deforestation of pre-1990 forest land if the species growing 
on the land is a specified type of tree weed and no units have been allocated with respect 
to the land under s71. ‘Tree weeds’ are defined under s184(9) of the Act as trees that are 
pests listed in a pest management strategy under the Biosecurity Act 1993, trees that are 
‘tree weeds’ as listed in regulations to the Act or tree that have naturally regenerated. 
 
Table 6: Deforestation activities 
Type of forest A hectare of land is ‘deforested’ when –  
Any forest a) Four years after clearing, the land has not been replanted 
with at least 500 stems of forest trees. 
b) Four years after clearing, the land does not have a 
naturally established covering of at least 500 stems of 
forest trees. 
Exotic forest 10 years after clearing, predominantly exotic forest species are 
growing, but the hectare lacks a tree crown cover that comprises 
of a least 30% from trees five metres of taller. 
Indigenous forest 20 years after clearing, predominantly indigenous forest species 
are growing, but the hectare lacks a tree crown cover that 
comprises of a least 30% from trees five metres of taller. 
        Source: Section 179 of the Act 
 
Post-1989 forest owners will not be required to enter the NZETS, but may do so 
voluntarily under s187 and s188 of the Act. This is to recognise that participating in the 
NZETS will not necessarily benefit all forest owners, particularly some owners of small 
forests (Lough and Cameron, 2008). Parties that choose to enter the scheme will have 
obligations relating to the net carbon stocks of their forests. If these stocks increase they 
will be awarded units, if they decrease they will have to surrender units. If post-1989 
forest owners choose not to enter the scheme the government will retain credits earned 
from those forests and will be responsible for liabilities incurred. 
 
The forestry sector entered the NZETS on 1 January 2008. The Labour-led government 
sought to bring this date as far forward as it could, as the Crown faced liabilities of 
between $180 million to $600 million (depending on the price of international emissions 
units) for each year that the forestry sector was excluded after this date. Policies to reduce 
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deforestation are seen as one of the most cost effective measures available in the near 
future for reducing emissions in New Zealand. Requiring foresters to bear the full cost of 
their emissions at an early stage is important both to ensure that deforestation is reduced 
and reduces compliance costs. The Labour-led government had been signalling its 
intention to impose deforestation controls since 2002, and its position was made clear in a 
number of consultation documents that followed. For this reason, most forestry 
stakeholders engaged in deforestation projects in the years immediately preceding 2008 
had ample time to prepare for controls to be imposed on deforestation. A transitional 
measure has been provided for, however, in s196. Participants will not be required to 
submit an annual emissions return for the year ending 31 December 2008, but will have 
to submit one for the year commencing 1 January 2009 and ending 31 December 2009.  
 
In general, the point of obligation lies with the owners of the land on which the forest 
grows. However, this obligation may be transferred to a third party if they have the had 
the decision to deforest vested in them. The criteria for the transferral of obligations are 
established in s180(1). The landowner must establish, to the satisfaction of the chief 
executive, that the right to decide to deforest was vested in a third party and that the 
landowner had no control over the decision. Section 180(3) makes it clear that, to avoid 
confusion, only landowners or third parties in the aforementioned category will be treated 
as carrying out an activity under Part 1 of Schedule 3 (deforesting pre-1990 forest). 
 
The Labour-led government decided to grant a free allocation of NZUs to owners of pre-
1990 exotic forests. The allocation will involve a total of 55 million units that will be 
allocated among landowners (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2007). Of these, 21 
million units will be allocated in CP1 and 34 million will be allocated during 2013-2021 
(see s71(b)). This is intended to recognise the economic loss suffered by forestry owners 
whose land values and profitability has fallen as a result of their obligations under the 
NZETS. It recognises the forest owners’ lost opportunity to profitably convert their 
forests to other land uses.  The 2008 draft allocation plan for forestry set out how units 
would be allocated to owners of pre-1990 forests 
 
Table 7 Allocation of units to pre-1990 forests 
Category Allocation 
Eligible Crown forest licence land that was 
or will be transferred to an iwi under a 
treaty of Waitangi settlement after 1 
January 2008. 
18 NZUs per hectare. 
Land that was transferred to an eligible 
land owner on or after 1 November 2002. 
Land transferred to a body corporate prior 
to 1 November 2002 but where the 
changes in ownership since that date 
greater than 51%. 
39 NZUs per hectare. 
All remaining NZUs from the 55 million unit 
forestry pool will be distributed equally on a 
per hectare basis across all other eligible 
land owners. 
Approximately 60 NZUs per hectare. 
Source: MAF (2008) 
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Afforestation is expected to increase as a result of the NZETS. There are incentives for 
forestry owners to act so as to reduce their NZETS obligations, thus increasing carbon 
stocks. It is expected that the NZETS will provide foresters with incentives to plant new 
forests on agricultural land where the expected value of the forest is likely to be greater 
than that of continued agriculture (especially in the case of sheep and beef). However, 
such land use change will be determined by international markets for timber, carbon and 
relevant meat prices (Cawthron, 2008). It is important to note that a reduction in the 
conversion of forest land to agriculture has a double benefit. Not only does the forest act 
as a carbon sink, but emissions from agriculture are also avoided (Cawthron, 2008). An 
increase in afforestation will have a number of spillover environmental benefits. These 
benefits included improved water quality and biodiversity in stream systems and reduced 
river erosion (Cawthron, 2008).  
 
The NZETS is complemented by two main policies. The first of these is the Permanent 
Forest Sink Initiative (PFSI), enshrined in Part 3B of the Forests Act (1949). The PFSI 
enables landowners of planted forests to earn Kyoto units (AAUs) for establishing 
permanent forest sinks. This entails restrictions on harvesting and a permanent covenant 
registered between the Crown and the landowner for a minimum of 50 years (Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry, 2007). 
 
The second is the Afforestation Grant Scheme (AGS). The AGS enables landowners to 
receive a government grant for planting forests on previously unforested land or assisted 
reversion of indigenous forests. Under the scheme, participants own the forests and can 
earn income from the timber produced. However, the Crown retains the sink credits and 
takes responsibility for meeting harvesting and deforestation liabilities (Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry, 2007). This scheme is expected to have lower compliance and 
transaction costs than the ETS for small forest owners. 
 
Agriculture  
 
New Zealand’s agriculture industry has long been a key component of the New Zealand 
economy. New Zealand’s stable and temperate climate has enabled an economy to be 
built around efficient primary production. Agriculture exports account for some 47% of 
total export income and around 53% of total merchandise exports. New Zealand is a 
leading player in the world dairy industry, producing approximately 40% of the world’s 
tradable dairy products and in the order of 66% of the world’s tradable lamb products 
(AgResearch). Agriculture contributes around 10% of New Zealand’s GDP and is a 
significant employer.  
 
The agriculture sector is New Zealand’s largest single emitter and makes up 
approximately 49% of total GHG (AgResearch, 2008). Methane is the main GHG emitted 
from agriculture and this gas makes up 35% of New Zealand’s gross total GHG 
emissions. Nitrogen oxide is also mainly produced through agricultural processes and 
amounts to 17% of total gross emissions (MfE, 2007f). Agriculture emissions are closely 
tied to the numbers of livestock being farmed. In the period from 1990 to 2003 methane 
emissions grew at an average of 0.4% per year. However, over this period, emissions 
from dairy cattle increased by approximately 52.3% as the intensity of dairy farming 
increased. During the same period emissions from sheep fell by 18.9%, as the sheep 
population reduced by over 30%. Nitrogen oxide emissions grew by 2.0% per year over 
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this period, mainly due to a significant increase in the use of synthetic nitrogen fertiliser 
and increased dairying. Of particular note is the methane emissions produced through 
enteric fermentation, a digestive process of ruminant animals. Methane produced as a 
result of enteric fermentation accounts for 31.3% of New Zealand’s total emissions. This 
is significantly higher than other OECD countries (inducing Australia and Ireland) and is 
reflective of increased dairy farming.7 
 
As previously noted, these statistics give New Zealand an unusual ‘emissions profile’ 
when compared to other Annex I (developed) nations. For example, Ireland, a country 
typically seen a being a comparatively similar country to New Zealand, has only 18.4% 
methane emissions and 14.2% nitrogen emissions. Australia also has relatively 
substantial methane emissions, amounting to 23.8% of its total emissions. This gap 
widens when New Zealand is compared to other developed nations; the European Union 
has methane emissions of only 8.5% of total GHG emissions and nitrogen oxide 
emissions of 7.9%. In Canada methane emissions are 12.9% of total GHG emissions and 
in the United States 8.6% (UNFCCC, 2003). 
 
The implication of these statistics is that New Zealand needs climate change policy 
tailored to fit its unique emissions profile, especially in relation to the agricultural sector. 
Following the policies of other developed countries whose agriculture emissions make up 
a comparatively small part of their gross emissions would be unlikely to produce 
effective policy in the New Zealand context. If New Zealand intends to take effective 
action to reduce emissions it is imperative that the agriculture sector is included in the 
NZETS. The CEO of AgResearch, Dr Andrew West, described New Zealand as the only 
developed nation needing to focus as much on the countryside as on cities in its action on 
climate change (AgResearch, 2008). It is also necessary for New Zealand to invest in 
research and development in order to reduce agricultural emissions. Research into 
agricultural emissions is a low priority in most developed nations as they account for only 
a small part of these countries’ emissions. In developing countries where agricultural 
emissions are typically high, research into reducing such emissions is also a low priority 
because governments are more concerned about increase economic growth and standards 
of living. New Zealand has the opportunity to develop world-leading technology to 
reduce agricultural emissions. Indeed, many of these technologies are already in the 
process of being developed, such as rumen microbial ecology, rumen microbial genetics, 
anti-methanogen vaccines, selective breeding, nitrification inhibitors and feed designed to 
produce lower emissions (AgResearch, 2007).  
 
Many claims have been made that emissions reductions will be difficult or prohibitively 
costly in the agriculture sector. For example, Castalia (2007) argue that there is no reason 
to expect that the agriculture industry will be able to reduce its emissions following its 
inclusion in the NZETS and that significant agricultural abatement is not possible without 
reducing output. However, Bertram and Terry (2008) cite a study prepared for the 
government by ICF International that casts doubt on these claims. The report found that 
agriculture could provide substantial and immediate low-cost emissions reductions, and 
that these reductions could be made a at profit for the farmer at emissions prices under 
$30/t.8 This indicates that reducing emissions in the agriculture sector should be further 
                                                 
7 For data see http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/climate/policy-review-05/html/page3-1.html (last 
accessed 14/1/09). 
8 See chapter 8.2 of Bertram and Terry (2008) for further information. 
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explored as a key area for reducing New Zealand’s total emissions and suggests that the 
government may have been too hasty in writing off the agriculture industry as a major 
area for emissions reductions. 
 
Under the NZETS agricultural participants can choose to report their emissions 
voluntarily in 2011, and are required to report their emissions in 2012 but they will not 
have to pay for their emissions until 2013. Because of its ‘competitiveness at risk’ status, 
agriculture does not have to bear the full costs of its emissions until 2030. It could also be 
argued that this delay in responsibility is an indication of the political power of the 
farming lobby in New Zealand. Until then, a proportion of the agriculture sector’s 
emissions will be covered by the free allocation of NZUs from the government. This is 
particularly important for farmers, who typically bear the burden of agricultural cost 
increases (MfE, 2007a). Section 76 of the Act sets out the process for the allocation of 
NZUs to the agriculture sector. The relevant Minister is required to create an allocation 
plan effective from 1 January 2013 but expiring no later than 31 December 2029. This 
allocation system is prescribed by s76(2)(b) and s76(2)(c) of the Act. For an allocation 
plan that is in force between 1 January 2013 and 31 December 2018 the Minister will be 
able to allocate a total amount of NZUs representing 90 NZUs for each 100 tonnes of 
emissions that resulted from the activities listed in Part 5 of Schedule 3 in 2005. For an 
allocation plan that is in force in any year between 1 January 2019 and 31 December 
2029, the total number of units available for the Minister begins at eleven-twelfths of the 
number of units available for allocation in 2018. This then declines each year at a linear 
rate to equal one twelfth of this number in 2029. 
 
The point of obligation – that is, the stage in the production chain that will be required to 
monitor, report, and surrender units in respect of emissions produced – has yet to be 
finalised for the agriculture sector. In respect of the use of synthetic fertilisers, it is likely 
that the point of obligation will be imposed high in the supply chain on nitrogen fertiliser 
suppliers (importers and producers). However, the points of obligation options for 
methane producing activities remain open. The two most likely are setting the point of 
obligation on farmers or on dairy/meat processors, with a processor level more likely. 
The view of officials is that the point of obligation does not need to be placed on the 
emitter directly, as the price signal created by the NZETS will move through the supply 
chain (MfE, 2007a). The former Labour-led government identified four key criteria to be 
used when assessing potential points of obligations (MfE, 2007a), namely: 
 Administrative and compliance costs 
 Coverage of emissions and emitters 
 Feasibility of monitoring 
 Incentives to reduce emissions. 
 
There are two competing rationales here. It is desirable to set a point of obligation that 
has low administrative and compliance costs since this reduces inefficiency and ideally 
ensures a smooth functioning of the system. Low costs are most easily achieved by 
minimising the number of participants at the point of obligation. It is far less costly to 
monitor the obligations of 25 processors than to monitor tens of thousands of farmers. 
However, this is in tension with a need to create incentives to change behaviour at the 
sources of emission production. It is arguable that such a goal is best achieved by placing 
the point of obligation on the actual emitters, rather than further down the supply chain. 
The former Labour-led government’s preferred point of obligation for methane producing 
  27 
activities appeared to be at the processing stage as the Government’s desire was to 
minimise the number of participants (MfE, 2007a). However it is likely that there will be 
significant consultation with the agriculture industry on the location of the point of 
obligation before the final decisions are taken and regulations drafted.  
 
Stationary Energy 
 
The stationary energy sector includes all fuels used for electricity generation and the 
direct production of power and heat in the industrial, commercial and residential sectors 
(MfE, 2007a). However it does not include emissions from liquid fuels used primarily in 
transport or emissions from industrial processes (both are covered elsewhere in the 
NZETS). 
 
New Zealand has a high proportion of renewable sources of electricity generation, 
amounting to about 70% of total generation, one of the highest in the world. This 
contributes to New Zealand’s unusual emissions profile where emissions from energy 
make up about half of what they would in most other developed nations. However, these 
emissions have been rising; emissions from electricity generation rose by 138% between 
1990 and 2006 - a result of an 879.4% increase in emissions from coal generation over 
this period (Ministry of Economic Development, 2007). Emissions in this sector are 
mainly CO2, with some methane produce in geothermal generation. 
 
Stationary energy is to be included in the NZETS from 1 January 2010. The former 
Labour-led government argued that this delay was justified on the basis of a relatively 
large number of participants and a need to engage in further consultation as to the point 
of obligation (MfE, 2007a). The point of obligation will lie with fuel producers with 
energy producers having the option to opt-in to the scheme, if the energy producers opt-in 
to the scheme, s212 removes the obligations of the fuel producers. The Labour-led 
government expressed a preference to have the point of obligation at that most upstream 
level of the supply chain. This would include coal, geothermal and gas extractors and 
importers. A number of exceptions are expected to be granted. They will include 
exported emissions sources, emissions sources used for non-fuel purposes and coal-seam 
methane that is not being sold.  
 
Electricity prices are expected to rise following the introduction of stationary energy into 
the NZETS framework. This, combined with increased costs of non-renewable generation, 
is expected to lead to an increase in the use of renewable generation, improvements in 
energy efficiency (for example, the purchase of more energy efficient appliances), an 
increase in household generation (for example, the use of solar panels for hot water 
heating), and a general reduction in electricity demand as consumers are encouraged to 
engage in more energy-saving behaviour such as turning off lights, taking shorter 
showers and using less heating.  
 
The stationary energy sector is not being allocated free units; participants will have to 
buy units from the market or from the government. The former Labour-led government 
argued that allocation of free units would not prevent higher prices being passed on to 
consumers (MfE, 2007a). Renewable electricity generation is not included in the NZETS, 
it is expected that renewable energy generators to gain indirect benefits from the NZETS 
as a result of higher wholesale electricity prices. 
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Accompanying the NZETS legislation was the Electricity (Renewable Preferences) 
Amendment Act. This legislation places a restriction on the building of new thermal 
electricity generation. This is intended to move New Zealand towards a target of 90% 
renewable energy generation by 2025. A higher proportion of renewable energy will 
require greater excess capacity to account for environmental variation and uncertainty 
(for example, an unusually dry year). There is an indication that the costs of excess 
capacity increase significantly once the renewable generation exceeds 90% (Ministry of 
Economic Development, 2007), but that until this point these costs are likely to only be 
moderate (Cawthron, 2008). Cawthron’s report identifies potential adverse consequences 
of an increase in renewable energy. These effects could include loss of land value from 
wind turbines, localised loss of biodiversity near geothermal sites and a loss of 
biodiversity and water availability from new hydropower sources (Cawthron, 2008). The 
National-led government formed following the 2008 General Election has repealed this 
legislation. 
 
The Ministry for the Environment predicts only moderate emissions reductions from 
stationary energy in the shorter term, but that a price of $15/t to $25/t could halt the 
growth of emissions from electricity generation in the longer term (approximately 2020) 
(MfE, 2007a). The Framework document identified the need, and the desire, to 
implement complementary policy to reduce electricity demand, such as incentives for 
consumers to purchase more energy efficient appliances or better household insulation.  
 
Liquid Fossil Fuels (transport) 
 
New Zealand has a heavy reliance on liquid fossil fuels. This reflects the country’s high 
level of car ownership, long, narrow geography, low-density urban areas and relatively 
poor public transport. New Zealand also requires liquid fossil fuel to transport exports to 
distant markets either with ships or aircraft. Total emissions produced by national and 
international transport increased by 58.3% between 1990 and 2006 (Ministry of 
Economic Development, 2007) with road transport being a significant driver. Emissions 
are expected to rise by about 35% by 2030 on a BAU scenario.  
 
Under the 2008 legislation liquid fossil fuels will be included in the NZETS from 1 
January 2011 with early reporting from 2010. Previously it had been proposed that liquid 
fuels be introduced from 1 January 2009 but the start date was delayed two years on the 
recommendation of the Finance and Expenditure Committee for the purpose of reducing 
inflationary pressures caused by high oil prices. New Zealand imports the majority of its 
oil and is heavily impacted by changes in the international market. This market is often 
volatile and the price of oil can change frequently and significantly. At the time when the 
Select Committee and the House were considering delaying the introduction of liquid 
fossil fuels into the scheme, oil prices were nearing the highest levels, in real terms, in 
decades. Politically, this was a good decision, implementing a policy adding to the 
already high price of petrol would have been unpopular. However, within months of the 
Act being passed into law oil prices had plummeted to some of the lowest levels seen in 
recent history. This shows not only the volatility of the market but also illustrates the risk 
in sacrificing climate policy for short-term political pressures. Ironically, the relatively 
low petrol prices in early 2009 would have provided a good basis for introducing liquid 
fossil fuels into the NZETS at that time. 
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Fuels covered under the NZETS include petrol, diesel, aviation gasoline, jet kerosene, 
light fuel oil and heavy fuel oil. Only fuels used domestically are covered; fuels used for 
international transport will be exempt, as will lubricating oils. The exemption of 
international transportation fuels was seen by officials as important given the high use of 
maritime transport to ship exports and a significant tourism industrial mainly involving 
aviation transport. These fuels are also not yet covered by Kyoto. Liquefied petroleum 
gas used for transport will be included under stationary energy. The preferred point of 
obligation is at a high level in the supply chain as this provides wide coverage for limited 
administrative and compliance costs. The point of obligation has been set on those 
removing fuel from a refinery for domestic use; this includes the five oil companies in 
New Zealand: BP, Caltex, Gull, Mobil and Shell. It is possible that jet fuel users will be 
able to opt-in to the scheme.  
 
The NZETS does not provide for a free allocation of units to the transport sector. It is 
suggested that the free allocation of units would not prevent price increases reaching 
consumers (MfE, 2007a). A free allocation of units may instead produce windfall profits 
for the fuel companies, without producing incentives to change behaviour. 
 
The Cawthron Institute notes that it is better to analyse transport in a functional sense, 
rather than simply looking at modes of transport. For instance, air travel can be broken 
down into business travel and personal travel. This is a useful analysis; breaking activities 
down into small, functional or location-based markets with defined elasticities can 
provide greater depth in the study of sectoral effects. New Zealand has typically been 
thought to have a relatively ‘inelastic’ (that is, price unresponsive) demand for transport 
fuel. Direct research on this has been limited in New Zealand. However, the studies have 
been done showing that an increase in fuel prices would produce a modest reduction in 
both traffic volume and fuel consumption (see Cawthron, 2008, quoting the Land 
Transport Safety Authority). A fall in medium-to-long-term demand of 3% per 10 cent 
increase in the price of a litre of petrol is suggested in the Framework. Cawthron suggests 
that fuel prices are likely to rise when liquid fossil fuels are include in the NZETS and 
this is likely to produce a small decrease in emissions from the transport sector. The 
Sustainability Council of New Zealand suggests that emission reductions from transport 
will be very low (Bertram and Terry, 2008). With a carbon price of $30/t it is predicted 
that the NZETS will reduce transport emissions by only 0.7%. The Ministry for the 
Environment suggests similar figures, a 0.3% reduction at a carbon price of $15/t and a 
0.6% reduction at $25/t (MfE, 2007a). It is important to note that these figures were 
calculated on the premise of liquid fossil fuels being included in the NZETS in 2009 but 
this has been delayed until 2011 – no doubt making the emission reduction based on 
these calculations even less. 
 
Other policy will also be put in place including incentives to move towards small cars 
with better fuel economy and better standards of driver training. The fuel economy 
measures involve the labelling of new and used vehicles with labels indicating their fuel 
efficiency in order to enable consumers to make a more informed choice. This could 
include a ‘fuel efficiency’ standard imposed on car dealers. The Ministry of Transport has 
also undertaken a number of other initiatives, including creating a website on fuel 
efficiency which enables consumers to calculate the fuel efficiency of their vehicles.9 
                                                 
9 www.fuelsaver.govt.nz (last accessed 14/1/09) 
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Industrial processes 
 
The industrial processes sector includes non-energy emissions created through the 
chemical transformation of material from one substance to another. Emissions from New 
Zealand’s industrial processes sector represented 5.6% of total GHG emissions in 2005 
(MfE, 2007a). Those emissions increased 31.8% from 1990 to 2005. There are five main 
industrial processes that are identified significant CO2-e emitters (MfE, 2007a): 
 Reduction of ironsand or recycled steel in steel production 
 Oxidation of anodes in aluminium production 
 Calcination of limestone for use in cement production 
 Melting of soda ash in glass production 
 Calcination of limestone for lime. 
 
The industrial processes sector also produces a number of other GHGs that are included 
in the NZETS; they include perfluorocarbons (PFCs) from aluminium smelting, 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) used as substitutes for ozone-depleting substances, PFCs 
from refrigerants, and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) from electrical switchgear (MfE, 
2007a). 
 
Under the 2008 legislation, the date of entry for industrial process emissions into the 
NZETS will be 1 January 2010. However, emissions of all synthetic gases will be exempt 
until 1 January 2013 because of a 2004 memorandum of understanding between the 
Crown and major users agreeing that the latter were to be exempt from any climate 
change policy costs in return for meeting a specified target. 
 
The Labour-led government proposed assistance to trade-exposed industries for increased 
costs caused by the NZETS both directly and indirectly (such as increased electricity 
costs). Under the 2008 legislation this will take the form of a free allocation of units 
representing 90% of 2005 emissions. The threshold for allocation and allocations will be 
specified in allocation plans. Bertram and Terry (2008) are critical of this proposed 
allocation. They argue that industry will receive more free units than their projected 
emissions, leaving them with surplus units and a windfall gain (Bertram and Terry, 2008). 
 
Waste 
 
It is estimated that the waste sector produces 2.4% of New Zealand’s total GHG 
emissions (MfE, 2007a). However, the waste sector has reduced its emissions by 26% 
from 1990 levels as a result of better landfill management, increased recycling and 
composting, and the rapid uptake of landfill gas recovery technologies (MfE, 2007a). 
Solid waste disposal is the main emitting activity in this sector. Methane emissions are 
created through bacterial the decomposition of organic material. The volume of emissions 
is dependent on a number of factors, such as disposal methods, moisture and temperature. 
Participants in this sector will only comprise of landfills that dispose of organic material 
(MfE, 2007a). 
 
The NZETS will only include the main gas produced by the waste sector, methane. It was 
decide that emissions of methane and nitrous oxide produced by wastewater treatment 
would not be included in the scheme. Despite accounting for approximately 0.5% of total 
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emissions, emissions from individual wastewater facilities are difficult to measure and 
such facilities are numerous. It was calculated that the costs of administering these 
emissions within the scheme outweighed the benefits that could be achieve from their 
inclusion (MfE, 2007a). Emissions from solid waste incineration are also excluded from 
the scheme, as there are no significant emitting solid waste incineration operations in 
New Zealand. However, there are indications that this may be revised if a major 
incineration operation is established (MfE, 2007a). 
 
The waste sector will not be included in the NZETS until 2013 but will have early 
reporting from 2011. This is due to the passing of the Waste Minimisation Act 2008, part 
of the Labour-led government’s broader sustainability programme. The Waste 
Minimisation Act imposed a levy on all waste disposed in landfills and is designed to 
reduce waste. The levy is designed not only to change behaviour as a price mechanism, 
but also to create funds for better waste management. It was decided that it would be 
inappropriate to impose two environmentally based price mechanisms on the sector and 
that its obligations under the NZETS should therefore be delayed. It is noted that the levy 
may be enough on its own to cause a sufficient reduction in emissions. If this is the case, 
the waste sector’s inclusion in the NZETS may be further delayed (MfE, 2007a).   
 
The point of obligation for this sector is likely to lie with landfill operators. The methods 
to be used for calculating emissions have yet to be determined, and will to be created in 
consultation with participants in the years leading up to the inclusion of the waste sector 
in the NZETS. The Labour-led government indicated that no free units would be assigned 
to this sector. 
 
Units of trade and international linkages 
 
Under the 2008 legislation New Zealand Units (NZUs) will be the primary unit of trade 
under the NZETS. NZUs will be issued and allocated by the government and will be able 
to be traded by any person. NZUs do not have an expiry date and will be available for use 
in future commitment periods. However, at this stage it is unlikely that participants will 
be able to until some resolution is given to the uncertainty surrounding post-2012 
arrangements. Each NZU represents one tonne of CO2-e and is backed by an AAU; this is 
designed to create an international market for NZUs. It is intended that NZUs be fully 
compatible and interchangeable with AAUs and to enable holders to use the Registry to 
exchange their NZUs for AAUs that can then be sold overseas (MfE, 2007a). NZUs can 
be used by participants to meet their obligations under the NZETS. Participants may also 
surrender some approved overseas Kyoto units. However, s18CB, subject to regulations, 
restricts the surrender of the imported AAUs during CP1. 
 
There has been debate as to whether New Zealand needs its own emissions unit. Some 
believe a New Zealand specific unit is unnecessary and problematic. The nature, design 
and definition of the four Kyoto units are relatively clear and well understood; the 
introduction of an NZU may lead to confusion as to where it fits in relation to the well-
established Kyoto units, particularly in an international context. Kyoto units are also 
directly required to meet New Zealand’s Kyoto obligations. The use of Kyoto units in the 
NZETS may give greater consistency and familiarity to those purchasing and trading 
units within the scheme.  
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In its report on the NZETS, the New Zealand Sustainability Council highlighted three 
potential issues with a market for NZUs (Bertram and Terry, 2008). The Council argued 
that unit holders may prefer to hold the more internationally ‘hard’ Kyoto units, resulting 
in a ‘flight’ from the NZU (the authors argue the complexities of the market for NZUs 
will cause them to be priced differently to Kyoto units). In this case, it is suggested, the 
government may either have to declare the NZU to be inconvertible for Kyoto units or 
devalue the NZU against the Kyoto units to entice buyers. This may lead to a ‘fixed 
exchange rate’ style of management, where the government is forced to buy Kyoto units 
to make up for an excess supply of NZUs. Secondly, the integrity of the NZU may be 
undermined by inflationary pressures created by an over issue of units (of course this can 
be avoided by sound issuance management). Finally, it is argued that there is a risk that 
New Zealand’s large energy supply companies will manipulate the market for NZUs. It is 
suggested that these factors will lead to uncertainty and economic inefficiencies. The 
price of NZUs is likely to be determined by the price of the lowest quality Kyoto unit – 
NZUs will only be brought if they are cheaper than the readily substitutable Kyoto units.  
 
However, there would be drawbacks on the sole use of Kyoto units in the scheme. There 
are issuance and banking restrictions on Kyoto units during CP1, particularly for the 
forestry sector (as discussed below) and the status of Kyoto units after 2012 is uncertain 
and depends on future international negotiations. 
 
Sin and Kerr and Hendy (2005) note that greater transaction costs are likely to flow from 
more complex systems of permits that are not well understood by stakeholders. This may 
reduce trading, transparency and make enforcement difficult. The authors acknowledge, 
however, that if there are only a small number of (typically sophisticated) participants 
required to hold permits then the complexity of the system will have less of an effect. It 
appears this may be the case with the NZETS. Excluding forestry (which may involve as 
many as 9,000 participants) the NZETS is expected to have approximately 170 firms 
serving as points of obligation (MfE, 2007a). 
 
An integral part of the NZETS is the New Zealand Emission Unit Register (NZEUR), 
administered by the Ministry of Economic Development. The register is fully electronic 
and will track and record transactions and the holding of Kyoto units. This includes the 
government, companies and private individuals. The NZEUR will be linked to the United 
Nations administered International Transaction Log. The NZEUR will hold New 
Zealand’s Commitment Period Reserve (CPR). The CPR is the requirement under the 
Kyoto Protocol that requires parties to hold a minimum number of Kyoto units (not 
NZUs) in its registry at all times – for New Zealand this is 90% of its total AAUs. The 
goal of the CPR is to ensure that parties can meet their targets by preventing them from 
overselling their AAUs. The NZEUR will be used by parties to hold and transfer NZUs 
and Kyoto units and, subject to restrictions, the holders of NZUs will be able to exchange 
them for Kyoto units through the registry. 
 
Administration and Enforcement 
 
Under the 2008 legislation, the NZETS is administered by both the Ministry of Economic 
Development and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. The Ministry of Economic 
Development is responsible for the operation of the NZEUR and is responsible for 
overseeing the ownership, transfer and surrendering of emissions units.  
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The Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading) Amendment Act is administered by 
the Ministry for the Environment. It is responsible for the development of allocation 
plans and regulations under the Act relating to the act generally and all but one of the 
sectors involved. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry is responsible for 
administering forestry and agriculture regulations and allocations under the Act. 
 
The Act provides penalties for failure to accurately report emissions and allows the 
administrator of the scheme to assess and audit emissions reports. These are important 
measures as the scheme involves self-assessment of emissions levels, similar to many 
income tax systems (Motu, 2008). 
 
Economic and Environmental Effects 
 
Macroeconomic Effects 
 
A number of different organisations have modelled the possible macroeconomic effects 
that may result from the introduction of the NZETS. Much of this modelling was done in 
the consultation stage and before some changes had been made to the legislation (for 
example, the delaying the introduction of liquid fossil fuels into the scheme until 2011). 
However, the models still remain useful in giving a general economic picture. 
 
Government officials identified two key considerations when assessing the effect the 
NZETS will have on the New Zealand economy (MfE, 2007a). They are: 
a. The international price of emissions (derived from the stringency of international 
agreements) 
b. Whether New Zealand is able to reduce emissions in a least cost manner, and 
whether New Zealand is able to help other countries do this (to gain Kyoto 
credits). 
Modelling undertaken by the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
(ABARE) for the New Zealand Government’s 2005 review of climate change policy 
indicated that a scheme similar to the NZETS (including agriculture and international 
linkage) with a carbon price of US$13/t CO2-e would reduce GDP by 0.04% in 2010 
relative to BAU levels. In 2006, Infometrics modelled the effect of a NZ$25/t CO2-e 
carbon tax on the New Zealand economy, found that 2011/2012 GDP would be reduced 
by no more than 0.1%. It is important to note that a reduction in GDP relative to BAU 
levels does not mean GDP will be 0.04% (for example) less than GDP today. Rather, it 
means that GDP in 2010 will be 0.04% less than it would otherwise have been at that 
time.  
 
Modelling carried out by the New Zealand Institute for Economic Research (2008) 
predicted a 0.5% fall in GDP by 2012 and a 2.1% fall by 2025. This was compared with a 
‘New Zealand pays’ scenario where the government pays its Kyoto commitments sans 
the NZETS. Under a ‘New Zealand pays’ scenario, GDP was predicted to fall by only 
0.1% by 2012 and 0.7% by 2025 (NZIER, 2008). However, any prediction of a ‘New 
Zealand pays’ outcome post-2012 depends entirely on what international agreements are 
reached and what commitments New Zealand adopts, and as such is essentially undefined. 
Furthermore, the initial expense of the NZETS in comparison to a ‘New Zealand pays’ 
scenario is not unexpected; the NZETS is intended to be the basis of New Zealand’s 
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climate change policy for decades to come, initial impacts and start-up costs arguably 
make the scheme appear more costly than it actually is.  Notwithstanding this, NZIER’s 
own modelling acknowledges that a ‘New Zealand pays’ scenario would not produce any 
domestic emissions reductions. Given this, an ETS is still the cheaper of the two options 
when it comes to reducing emissions.  
 
A report produced by Castalia (2007) criticises what it sees as the key assumptions made 
by the government – that adjustment costs will be negligible, that New Zealand firms will 
be able to access carbon permits at low and stable prices and that the competitiveness of 
New Zealand firms will not be undermined. It is argued that adjustment costs will be high 
as the New Zealand economy has few options for reducing emissions and that most of 
our emissions-intensive industries are already operating at ‘world’s best practice’ 
emissions level and technology does not exist to reduce agriculture emissions. However, 
there is evidence that significant emissions reduction can be made with relative ease in 
New Zealand’s agriculture sector (Bertram and Terry, 2008). Further research and 
development in emissions reducing technologies is likely to more effective options for 
reducing emissions. It has been argued that New Zealand ought to be a ‘fast follower’ 
rather than a leader on climate change policy (The New Zealand Institute, 2007). 
However, it may not be enough for New Zealand to be a ‘fast follower’ on agriculture 
emissions simply because there is little to follow. If New Zealand is serious about 
reducing its emissions and meeting international commitments, methods of reducing 
agriculture emissions must be found and applied. 
 
Castalia argues that the NZETS will cause the New Zealand economy to lose 
competitiveness in international markets. It is argued that a lack of international action 
will hurt New Zealand industries whose foreign competitors will not face similar 
emissions related costs. The Ministry for the Environment maintains that ‘loss of 
competitiveness’ arguments are often exaggerated. Castalia does not sufficiently 
acknowledge the significant protection given to both agriculture and trade exposed 
industry over the next two decades under the NZETS (as of late 2008). Castalia’s 
argument that foreign nations are not taking action is also weak. While it is correct that 
many countries have yet to adopt emissions trading, it is not acknowledge that many of 
these countries intend to have trading schemes in place before the end of CP1, for 
example Australia and the United States (see below). It is likely that many countries will 
have similar trading schemes in place once protection is finally lifted on New Zealand’s 
trade exposed industries and agriculture.  
 
The Australian Treasury (2008) undertook an in-depth modelling of climate policy. They 
found that early global action was less expensive than later action. Furthermore, this 
finding also held even if other countries chose to defer action on climate change as those 
who delayed action faced higher long-term costs. This suggests that early action may be 
more economically beneficial than a ‘fast follower’ approach proposed by the New 
Zealand Institute (2007). The Australian Treasury’s report concluded that under all 
modelled scenarios a market-based approach enabled ‘robust economic growth into the 
future’. The report found that the reduction in the level of GDP in 2050 relative to the 
reference scenario used ranged from 3.7% to 5.8% in the various scenarios modeled, 
these figures are low given that Australian GDP is expected to be approximately three 
times larger in 2050 than in 2005. The report argued that large emissions reductions 
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could be achieved without a significant reduction in economic activity, as the economy 
will restructure in response to the price of carbon. 
 
 
Microeconomic effects 
 
All economic effects will depend on the price of carbon, which, of course, fluctuates with 
international markets. Most models assess the effects of both a $15/t and $25/t price of 
carbon to account for this uncertainty. The Ministry for the Environment has outlined 
potential price changes that may occur from different prices of carbon under the NZETS 
(MfE, 2007a). A 3.7 ($15/t) or 6.1 ($25/t) cent increase in petrol prices per litre was 
predicted, as was 1 ($15/t) or 2 ($25/t) cent increase in retail electricity prices and the 
retail price of a $20 bag of coal was expect to increase by $0.90 ($15/t) or $1.50 ($25/t). 
The consequence of the above figures is likely to be a $100 (minimum prediction at $15/t) 
to $330 (maximum prediction at $25/t) increase in average household energy expenditure 
per annum. This amounts to a 0.3% to 0.8% increase in average household expenditure. 
 
The agriculture sector is a price taker on the international market; this prevents it being 
able to pass on all cost increase to consumers. According to the Ministry for the 
Environment, the participation of the agricultural sector in the NZETS is important to 
maintain its international competitiveness, especially in light of movements such as ‘food 
miles’ in Europe.10 Some modelling was done on how participation in the ETS would 
affect agriculture payouts in 2013, the figures are only indicative, not exact (MfE, 2007a). 
Dairy was the biggest loser with a fall from BAU payouts of 1% ($15/t) or 1.6% ($25/t). 
Beef and venison farmers’ payouts are expected to fall by no more than 0.3% but sheep 
farmers may lose up to 1.2%. The price of nitrogen fertilizers is expected to increase by 
7% in 2013 assuming a carbon price of $15/t.  
 
The value of pre-1990 forests is expected to fall due to the cost of deforestation liabilities 
created under the ETS (although this will be offset in part by the free allocation of units 
to affected participants). However, the ETS will provide the owners of post-1989 forests 
and those wishing to afforest suitable land with a new source of income from their forests. 
 
The report of the Australian Treasury on the economics of climate change mitigation 
(2008) found that the competitiveness of many of Australia’s industries were likely to 
improve or remain the same given coordinated international action on climate change. 
The report found that carbon prices were unlikely to be high enough to induce significant 
relocation of industry and the allocation of free permits could ease the transition process 
in many industries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 ‘Food miles’ refer to the distance which food (or any good) has travelled from the location of production 
to its point of consumption. The further food has travelled the more GHGs have been produced as a result 
of its transport. 
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Environmental effects 
 
As of May 2008 New Zealand is expected to be in a Kyoto deficit of 21.7 million units 
during CP1 (this was revised down from an estimation of 45.5 million units made in 2007, 
this may be revised further in light of the economic recession). The previous Labour-led 
government made no strong prediction on how successful the ETS will be at reducing 
emissions and bringing New Zealand towards its Kyoto target. One model of a possible 
change in New Zealand’s Kyoto liability is proposed which sees the Kyoto liability 
failing to 35 MtCO2-e from BAU levels of 45.5 MtCO2-e (if the government retains all 
afforestation credits for compliance during CP1) or 124.5 MtCO2-e (if the government 
fully devolves afforestation credits to landowners) (MfE, 2007a). 
 
The Framework document concluded that it is difficult to predict the economic and 
environmental effects of emissions trading with any great certainty. However, 
international experience has suggested that emissions trading is effective at reducing 
emissions in a cost-effective manner. Bertram and Terry (2008) criticised the Ministry for 
the Environment for not performing an estimation of the emissions reductions that the 
NZETS would achieve. Bertram and Terry’s own estimations concluded that the scheme 
would reduce emissions by less than 2% over the first Kyoto commitment period (note 
that this figure was calculated before the entry of liquid fossil fuels was delayed until 
2011). This echoed the Cawthron’s (2008) prediction that emissions reductions in New 
Zealand would be limited until 2013 when agriculture enters the scheme. However, like 
the Ministry for the Environment, Cawthron argued that it was difficult, if not impossible, 
to predict emissions reductions with any accuracy due to the number of other factors 
involved. 
 
The NZIER predicted that the NZETS would produce a 2.6% reduction in emissions by 
2012, a 6.4% reduction in 2015 and a 10.4% reduction in 2025. Their modelling did not 
predict any reduction in emissions in any period by virtue of a ‘New Zealand pays’ 
scenario (presumably there would be an actual increase in emissions i.e. BAU levels). 
The goal of climate change policy must be to reduce emissions as lowest cost, if the 
policy does not effect emissions it cannot be considered effective.  
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Table 8: Modelling of Environmental Effects (GHG reductions)11 
Sector MfE Framework (2007) Bertram and Terry (2008) Cawthron (2008) 
Electricity BAU – increase in 
emissions 
ETS Short term – ‘moderate 
reductions’ 
ETS Long term – A price of 
$15 to $25/t CO2-e would 
keep emissions at ‘about 
current levels’ 
BAU over CP2 – 34 Mt CO2-
e increase. 
CP1 ETS – reduction of 3.1 
Mt CO2-e (~9%) 
Short term – emissions from 
coal are expected to fall and 
emissions from gas use and 
electricity generation are 
likely to increase.  
Long term – reduction in 
emissions. 
Transport BAU – a 40% increase by 
2030. 
Price of $15/t CO2-e – 0.3% 
reduction from BAU levels. 
Price of $20/t CO2-e – 0.6% 
from BAU levels. 
BAU CP1 – 80 Mt CO2-e 
increase. 
CP1 ETS – reduction of 0.4 
Mt CO2-e (~0.1%). 
Short term – slight decrease 
in emissions growth. 
Long-term reductions – 
dependant on price of 
emissions and technology 
development. 
Forestry Reduction in deforestation 
and an increase in 
afforestation, leading to 
reduced emissions. 
BAU CP1 – 20 Mt CO2-e 
increase in emissions from 
deforestation. 
ETS CP1 – 14.1 Mt CO2-e 
reduction from avoided 
deforestation (although not 
all due to the ETS). 
Reduction in emissions from 
reduced deforestation and 
increased afforestation (see 
agriculture). 
Agriculture Pre 2013 – Indirect 
emissions reductions from 
less conversion of forest 
land into farmland and 
higher stationary energy 
prices. 
Post 2013 – Reduction 
relative to BAU. 
BAU CP1 – 203 Mt CO2-e 
increase. 
CP1 ETS – no reduction. 
Pre 2013 – Indirect savings 
of 21 Mt CO2-e from avoided 
deforestation/conversion. 
However, delaying the 
introduction of agriculture 
until 2013 puts these 
benefits at risk. 
Post 2013 – dependant on 
price of emissions and 
technology development. 
Other Industry – uncertain, but 
opportunities exist to reduce 
emissions. 
Level of reductions 
dependant on price of 
emissions. 
Non-transport liquid fossil 
fuel – BAU CP1 increase of 
19 Mt CO2-e. CP1 ETS – 
0.5 Mt CO2-e reduction 
Waste and other – 
BAU CP1 – 7 Mt CO2-e 
increase. 
CP1 ETS – no reduction. 
Non-electricity stationary 
energy and industrial 
process –  
BAU CP1 – 62 Mt CO2-e 
increase. 
CP1 ETS – 1.9 Mt CO2-e 
reduction. 
Industry – gradual reduction 
in emissions. Dependant on 
technology and behavioural 
change. 
Mining – uncertain, possible 
gradual decline. 
Waste – gradual decline 
from entry in 2013. 
Total 
reduction 
Reduction on BAU levels. At most a 5.9 Mt CO2-e 
reduction over CP1 (~2%) 
excluding deforestation. 
Reduction on BAU levels. 
                                                 
11 These calculations are based off the Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading and Renewable 
Preferences) Amendment Bill and the details presented in A Framework for a New Zealand Emissions Trading 
Scheme. 
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International comparisons 
 
While the NZETS is globally the first ETS to include all sectors and all gases it is by no 
means the first or only such scheme in place. Moreover, a number of countries (and sub-
national governments) are in the process of designing new schemes. A sample of ETS 
models from around the world is discussed below.  
 
Europe 
 
In 2005 the European Union established the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EUETS), one of the world’s first and largest mandatory emissions trading schemes. 
While not as sectorally comprehensive as the NZETS, the EUETS involves 25 countries, 
some 12,000 installations and 6 major sectors. The sectors covered included electric 
power, oil refineries, coke ovens, metal ore and steel, cement kilns, glass, ceramics and 
paper and pulp. It has been proposed that more sectors will be added, including domestic 
aviation from 2011, international aviation from 2012, some metal refining from 2013 and 
chemical industrial processes, also from 2013. Two notable exclusions are forestry and 
agriculture – both of which are included under the New Zealand scheme. Indeed, 
emissions units generated by forest sinks cannot be used under the EUETS because it is 
argued that their effectiveness is uncertain and that reductions from industry emissions 
are superior, although there have been some calls to ease this restriction. At this stage the 
EUETS only covers CO2 emissions from stationary energy and industrial processes, not 
all GHGs (such as methane from agriculture) or all sectors (notably agriculture and 
transport). This is expected to be expanded to included nitrous oxide and 
perfluorocarbons from 2013.  
 
Australia 
 
The Australian state of New South Wales established one of the worlds first emissions 
trading schemes, the Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme (GGAS), on 1 January 2003. 
This was expanded into the Australian Capital Territory on 1 January 2005 with aim of 
reducing GHG emissions in the electricity sector. The scheme set a mandatory 
benchmark for buyers and sellers of electricity based on their share of electricity demand. 
This is met by surrendering ‘abatement certificates’ created by project based emissions 
reduction activities. If a benchmark participant fails to surrender enough certificates to 
meet it benchmark it must pay a penalty of AU$12.00 per tonne of the shortfall in 
emissions (GGAS 2008). 
 
Australia has been slow in adopting international agreement on climate change, only 
ratifying the Kyoto Protocol in 2007. However, since then, climate change policy has 
been moving with some pace. Australia’s proposed response to climate change has been 
envisioned in the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) green paper released in 
July 2008. The Australian government has favoured an ETS over a tax because it believes 
emissions trading better focuses on environmental goals by controlling the quantity of 
emissions directly (Department of Climate Change, 2008). The Australian government 
also believes that emissions trading is more consonant with international climate change 
policy and that such schemes provide a better mechanism for enabling firms to manage 
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uncertainty. Legislation for the CPRS is expected to be introduced in May 2009 and 
enacted later in the year.12 
 
The CPRS shares similarities with the NZETS. It is a cap and trade scheme that is 
planned to commence in mid 2010. The CPRS seeks to create a wide-reaching scheme 
encompassing from the outset sectors including stationary energy, transport, fugitive 
emissions, industrial processes, waste and forestry – unlike the NZETS, it is not 
envisioned that the introduction of sectors will be staggered (although agriculture may 
enter the scheme in 2015). Forestry under the CPRS is treated differently to the NZETS; 
under the CPRS participation will only be voluntary with forest owners being able to ‘opt 
in’ to the scheme – however, this will only included post-1989 ‘Kyoto’ forests. 
Deforestation activities are excluded from the CPRS as it is argued that deforestation in 
Australia has already been reduced significantly since 1990. Unlike the NZETS 
agriculture is not included in the CPRS; a final decision is to be made on the inclusion of 
agriculture by 2013 and it is recommended that agriculture not enter the scheme before 
2015. Many other areas of the CPRS are similar, an Australia Emissions Unit (AEU) will 
be created, free units will be allocated to trade exposed industries, assistance given to 
strongly affected industries and all Kyoto gases will be included. 
 
Entities will be required to be participants under the CPRS is they directly emit more than 
25,000 tonnes of CO2-e per year, although it is noted that different thresholds maybe 
necessary for the waste sector and synthetic GHGs. This threshold will be the general 
point of obligation. However there will be other points of obligations. In the stationary 
energy sector a point of obligation will lie at the fuel supplier for smaller energy users 
(presumably ones below the threshold). Obligations in the transport sector will also lie 
with fuel suppliers.  
 
For the first five years the CPRS will have a carbon price cap, an option that was rejected 
in the New Zealand scheme. The cap will be set high enough so that its probability of use 
will be low given expected international carbon prices. Along with a price cap, the 
scheme will also have an emissions cap, set for a period of at least five years. The scheme 
includes a long-term target of reducing emissions by 60% of 2000 levels by 2050. 
 
Over the period 2010-2011 to 2012-2013 AAUs will not be accepted under the CPRS. 
Units that will be accepted are AEUs, ERUs, RMUs, and CERs (except tCERs and 
lCERs), and these units may be banked. Non-Kyoto international units (such as the NZU) 
will not be accepted under the scheme. It was decided that including these units would 
add unnecessary administrative complexity to the scheme given that these non-Kyoto 
units could not be used to meet Australia’s Kyoto obligations. Over the long term the 
scheme proposes that the allocation of AEUs will move towards complete auctioning, 
with the exception of assistance for trade-exposed and strongly affected industries. The 
free allocation for trade-exposed industries (excluding agriculture which is yet to be 
included in the scheme) would amount to approximately 20% of Australia’s AEUs. This 
assistance will decrease over time, and will be dependant on the actions of Australia’s 
competitors beyond 2020.  
 
 
                                                 
12 See http://www.climatechange.gov.au/emissionstrading/timetable.html (last accessed 14/1/09) 
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Japan 
 
Japan established a voluntary emissions trading scheme in 2005, the ‘Japanese voluntary 
emissions trading scheme’ (JVETS). The Japanese government used the scheme as a 
means of gathering information on cost-efficiency and management of emissions 
reduction policy, and the effectiveness of voluntary schemes. The scheme is only 
includes CO2 emissions and uses both CERs and JPAs (Japanese emissions allowance). 
Under JVETS, firms that entered the scheme set concrete emissions reduction targets. 
Firms receive economic incentives for reducing emissions, in the form of subsidies for 
emissions reducing technology amounting to one third of the cost of the emissions 
reduction activity. However, if a firm fails to meet its target it must return the subsidy to 
the government. Of note, the scheme is facility based, not company based, and facilities 
are selected on the cost-effectiveness of possible emissions reductions. Participants are 
able to bank excess emissions units for use in future periods. Also of note is that the 
scheme is limited to only 32 participants in the first round of the scheme (this will be 
extended to 58 in the second) and it does not include major emitting industries (most 
notably electricity generation). Concerns have been raised that the voluntary nature of the 
scheme encourages firms to set low targets and achieve it excessively. It is likely that a 
mandatory scheme will be introduced in Japan in the near future.13 
 
Norway  
 
Norway introduced an ETS in 2005. It coved only CO2 emissions and 51 institutions 
representing 10-15% of total emissions (mainly industry and some from the energy 
sector). This scheme was linked with the EUETS in 2008 by conforming to the EU’s 
emissions trading directive. 
 
United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom is a participant in the EUETS. Notwithstanding this, the UK has 
proposed a Carbon Reduction Commitment scheme covering CO2 emissions from large 
non-energy intensive business and public sector entities that a not covered by the EUETS. 
The mandatory scheme initially involves the non-capped fixed price sale of allowances, 
this will later be capped and allowances auctioned. The scheme is designed to include 
firms that fall below EU electricity use threshold but whose total contribution amounts to 
10% of the UK’s total emissions, such as supermarkets, banks, hotels and government 
bodies (Department of Trade and Industry, 2007). The threshold is a half-hourly metered 
electricity consumption of greater than 6,000 MWh per year. Organisations covered 
under the EUETS or other domestic climate change policy will be exempt form the 
scheme. 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 For further information on the JVETS see 
http://www.iges.or.jp/en/cp/pdf/activity06/07.pdf  (last accessed 14/1/09) 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/research/seminars/japan/japan3.pdf (last accessed 14/1/09) 
http://www.icapcarbonaction.com/docs/mrvce_material/session1/Session_I_Yasushi_Ninomiya_Japan2.pdf 
(last accessed 14/1/09) 
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North America 
 
The United States government has been slow to address the problem of climate change 
and has contributed little to international agreement – it remains the only developed 
nation yet to (and unlikely to) ratify the Kyoto Protocol. However, in line with trends 
around the world a willingness to act is developing. At a federal level the recently elected 
President, Barack Obama, has signalled a desire to take strong action on climate change 
and a preference to use an economy-wide cap-and-trade programme with a goal of 
reducing GHG emissions 80% by 2050, with a proposed 100% auctioning of units 
(Obama-Biden, 2008). Ten northeastern states currently participate in Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). The RGGI is a cap-and-trade scheme imposing 
obligations on CO2 emissions from power plants with a generating capacity of 25 MW or 
greater. Permit auctioning began in late 2008, and a three-year commitment period began 
on 1 January 2009. Revenue generated from the scheme will be used to promote energy 
conservation and renewable energy (RGGI, 2008). Another proposed regional climate 
change initiative is the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), established in the main by 
states in the west of North America; it currently involves 11 participating members and 
13 observing states. It seeks to establish a foundation for a cross-boarder ETS involving 
the United States and Canada. The current participants in the scheme have agreed to 
being reporting in 2011 for 2010 emissions. The trading scheme will itself begin in 2012, 
with an expected expansion in 2015 (WCI, 2008). 
 
Conclusion 
 
The NZETS hopefully signals a new era of climate change policy in New Zealand. The 
scheme is novel in many respects, even world leading. However, the importance of these 
factors should not be over stated. In many ways the novelty of the NZETS was driven not 
the Labour-led government’s desire for New Zealand to be a world leader on climate 
change, rather it resulted from the uniqueness of New Zealand’s emissions profile and a 
recognition of the steps needed to make real reductions in New Zealand’s emissions. 
Major emissions reductions need to come from major emitters, and it is for this reason 
that all sectors, including the agriculture sector, are participants in the NZETS. Other 
emissions trading schemes can afford to exclude agriculture (if they so desire) in order to 
reduce emissions as agriculture emissions make up only a small part of their total 
emissions. New Zealand does not have this luxury, the inclusion of agriculture in the 
NZETS is necessary if the scheme is going to create real and overseas comparable 
emissions reductions.  
 
Concern remains as to the effect the NZETS will have on both the New Zealand economy 
and New Zealand’s emissions record. Estimates and modelling as to the economic cost of 
the scheme vary greatly and are heavily influenced by their assumptions. Emissions 
reduction need not be costly, in fact for a small, technologically inventive country like 
New Zealand creating new emissions reducing technology could provide significant 
economic opportunity. New Zealand needs to be a ‘future-maker’; while New Zealand 
alone cannot make a significant difference to the world’s climate, it can show the world 
how efficient and effective emission reductions can be made. Reducing emissions is also 
important for New Zealand’s reputation and trade. Consumers globally are becoming 
more ‘carbon conscious’ in what they purchase and where they travel. With distances so 
great between New Zealand and its trading and tourist markets it will be imperative in 
  42 
coming years that ‘brand New Zealand’ includes a reputation for responsible and 
effective action on climate change.  
 
It is important that the new National-led government, and future governments beyond it, 
do not undo the large amount of work that has been done in the creation of the NZETS. 
New Zealand has struggled with hesitancy in its climate change policy for over a decade. 
Now that substantive action has been taken, it is the time to look forward and not return 
to the tired debates of days gone by. It is also valuable to remember that if emitters do not 
bear the costs of their emissions, this burden then falls to the taxpayer, and ultimately 
future generations.  
 
The NZETS is a valuable start to effective emissions reduction policy in New Zealand. It 
has been slow coming, but should serve as a platform to further expand future climate 
change policy in New Zealand. Concerns remain able the NZETS, its short term 
environmental effectiveness appears limited – an objection often raised toward the Kyoto 
Protocol. However, it is important to view both the Kyoto Protocol and the NZETS in 
context. They provide a framework to build from in future agreements and policy, neither 
attempt, nor are able, to provide a panacea to our global and local climate change 
problems. What they provide is a start. It is important that we as a nation continue to 
build on this beginning and do not once again put climate change policy in the ‘too-hard’ 
basket. 
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Appendix A:  A Short Chronology of New Zealand’s Climate Change Policy 
 
August 1990 – New Zealand’s first climate change policy announced by the Fourth 
Labour government. This policy committed to reduce CO2 emissions by 
20% from 1990 levels by 2005 (later revised to 2000).  
October 1990 – National defeated Labour in the 1990 General Election. 
1992 – The National government released a ‘Carbon Dioxide Reduction Action Plan’ 
committing to a reduction in CO2 emissions of 20% from 1990 levels by 
2000. 
November 1993 – National won the 1993 General Election. 
1994 – New Zealand ratified the UNFCCC New Zealand’s emissions target was revised  
  to a reduction in emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. This would come from  
  a mix of voluntary agreements, energy reform and forestry. The   
  government threatened to impose a carbon tax if industry failed to cut  
  emissions by 1997. 
October 1996 – A National-led government was formed following 1996 General   
  Election. 
1997 – No carbon tax was implemented, despite growing emissions. The government  
  adopted the Kyoto Protocol target of reduction CO2-e emissions to   
  1990 levels during the first commitment period (2008-2012). 
May 1998 – The Kyoto Protocol was signed by the National government. 
November 1999 – A Labour-led government was formed following the 1999 General  
  Election. 
Late 2001 – The Ministry of Economic Development lead a working group focused  
  on the design of an ETS involving dialogue sessions with    
  representatives from the transport and oil sectors, the waste industry,  
  and the coal, gas and geothermal industry. The Department of Prime  
  Minister and Cabinet published the results of consultation on whether  
  New Zealand should ratify the Kyoto Protocol. It was noted that many  
  submitters lacked an understanding of New Zealand’s international  
  obligations. 
Early 2002 – The government released its preferred policy package on climate change.  
  This included a carbon tax on energy, industrial, and transport emissions,  
  capped at $25 per tonne of CO2-e, the exemption of agricultural emissions  
  from any broad based price measure during CP1, ‘Negotiated Greenhouse  
  Agreements’ for large emitters who risked a loss of competitiveness,  
  ‘Projects to Reduce Emissions’ to provide addition Kyoto units during  
  CP1, joint industry and government funding of research in the agricultural  
  sector and government retention of sink credits and associated liabilities  
  from forestry. 
  The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet published the results of  
  a consultation document on the government’s preferred policy    
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  package for dealing with climate change. It found that stakeholders  
  generally accepted the package. 
July 2002 – A Labour-led government was formed following 2002 General Election 
November 2002 - The Climate Change Response Act 2002 was passed. The Act put in  
  place a legal framework to allow New Zealand to ratify the Kyoto   
  Protocol and to meet its obligations under the UNFCCC. 
December 2002 – The Labour-led government ratified The Kyoto Protocol. The   
  government proposed that a carbon tax capped at $25 per tonne of CO2  
  be in place by the beginning of the first commitment period as a means of  
  achieving New Zealand’s Kyoto commitments. 
January 2005 – The European Union establishes the EUETS. 
September 2005 – A Labour-led government was formed following the 2005   
  General Election. The government dropped its proposed carbon tax due to  
  a lack of parliamentary support caused by the opposition of governing  
  partners New Zealand First and United Future to the introduction of a tax. 
December 2006 – The government released five consultation documents as part of its  
  Draft Energy Strategy.  
The consultation process included approximately 50 public or multi-sector 
meetings, workshops, Hui, and approximately 100 focused stakeholder 
meetings. 
September 2007 – The government released a proposal for a NZETS, ‘Framework for a  
  New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme’. The Climate Change   
  (Emissions Trading and Renewable Preference) Amendment Bill was  
  introduced as the mechanism for establishing the scheme.  
2008 – The first Kyoto Commitment Period began.  
Early 2008 – The Finance and Expenditure Select Committee heard submissions on the  
  Bill. The National and the Greens gave minority views. The Bill was split  
  by the Committee of the Whole into The Climate Change (Emissions  
  Trading) Amendment Bill and the Electricity (Renewable Preferences)  
  Amendment Bill.  
August 2008 – The Labour-led government won the support of the Greens and New  
  Zealand First, giving it a parliamentary majority supporting the passage of  
  the bill. In return for their support the Labour-led government promised  
  the Greens a NZ$1 billion household insulation fund, and promised New  
  Zealand First greater support to those on low incomes facing higher  
  electricity prices. 
9 September 2008 – The Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading) Amendment  
  Bill passes its third reading with the support of Labour, the Progressives,  
  the Greens and New Zealand First. 
25 September 2008 – The Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading) Amendment  
  Act was passed into law. Forestry enters the NZETS. 
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16 November 2008 - A National-led government was formed following 2008 General  
  Election.  
11 December 2008 – The National-led government announced that the Climate Change  
  Response (Emissions Trading) Amendment Act and other climate change  
  measures would be reviewed by a Select Committee, this was to honour  
  the terms of the confidence and supply agreement between National and  
  ACT. 
1 January 2010 – The stationary energy sector and the industrial processes sector enter  
  the NZETS. 
1 January 2011 – Transport enters the NZETS. 
2012 – The first Kyoto Commitment Period ends. 
1 January 2013 – Agriculture, waste and other sectors enter the NZETS. 
2029 – Free allocation of NZUs to Agriculture ends. 
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Appendix B: Kyoto units 
 
The Kyoto Protocol established four types of ‘emissions units’ that Annex B (developed) 
countries can use to meet their obligations. Each unit represents one tonne of CO2-e 
emissions. Each Annex B country must retire emissions units covering their emissions 
during CP1; the four types of units are interchangeable for this purpose. The Protocol 
establishes three ‘flexibility mechanisms’ to enable units to be acquired from other 
countries through emissions trading, clean development mechanism projects and joint 
implementation projects. The units are: 
 
Assigned amount units (AAUs) – These units are allocated freely to Annex B countries 
and match the targets set in each individual country, they represent that countries 
‘allowed emissions’. For example, New Zealand has committed under the Kyoto Protocol 
to contain its emissions to five times 1990 levels on average between 2008 and 2012. 
New Zealand is therefore assigned an amount of AAUs of five times the amount of 
emissions produced in 1990. Article 17 of the Protocol allows these units to be traded by 
Annex B countries, that is, countries that have more AAUs than needed to meet their 
Kyoto commitments may trade the excess to countries that exceed their targets. In theory, 
this gives developed states a financial incentive to reduce emissions. This represents a 
‘cap and trade’ system, with the total amount of AAUs issued to Annex B parties forming 
the ‘cap’. 
 
Certified emission reductions (CERs) – These credits are generated from emission 
reductions created by clean development mechanism (CDM) projects. The CDM was 
established under Article 12 of the Protocol. It is designed to provide incentives to 
developed (Annex I) countries to undertake emissions reduction or limitation 
programmes in developing (non-Annex I) countries. The goal of this is to promote 
emission reduction activities in developing countries, and also provide developed nations 
with flexibility in how they meet their CP1 commitments. These projects can be certified 
and receive CERs equivalent to one tonne of CO2-e. The Protocol establishes that 
certification is to be judged on the basis of: 
a. Voluntary participation by each party involved  
b. Real, measurable and long-term benefit related to the mitigation of climate change, 
and 
c. Reductions in emissions that are additional to any that would occur in the absence 
of the certified project activity. 
Once earned, CERs can be sold or used to meet Kyoto obligations. There are two other 
forms of CERs: temporary certified emission reductions (tCERs) and long-term certified 
emissions reductions (lCERs). These are generated by CDM forestry projects and are not 
accepted under the NZETS due to concerns about the environmental integrity of these 
projects and carry a risk of future liabilities for the Crown (MfE 2007a). 
 
Emission reduction units (ERUs) – ERUs are generated through a mechanism called 
‘joint implementation’ (JI) established under Article 6 of the Protocol. A JI project is one 
that is undertaken by an Annex B party to reduce or remove emissions in another Annex 
B country. Participation in a JI project can earn the parties ERUs, equivalent to one tonne 
of CO2-e, which can be sold or used to meet CP1 Commitments. The ‘host party’ also 
benefits from the foreign investment that is involved, by receiving new low emission 
technology and reducing emissions. The criteria for JI projects are similar to that of CERs, 
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requiring the approval of the parties involved and a reduction in emissions that is 
additional to that which would have occurred. 
 
Removal units (RMUs) – RMUs are units issued to Annex B countries for net emission 
removals from land use, land use change and forestry activities (LULUCF) such as 
emission removals from forest sinks or reforestation. An RMU is equal to one tonne of 
CO2-e and can be used by Annex B parties to meet their CP1 commitments. 
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Appendix C: Glossary of abbreviations 
 
AAU  – Assigned Amount Unit 
ABARE – Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics  
AEU – Australian Emissions Unit 
BAU – Business as usual  
CDM – Clean Development Mechanism 
CER – Certified Emissions Reduction 
CO2 – Carbon dioxide  
CO2-e – Carbon dioxide equivalent  
CP1 – Kyoto Commitment Period One 
CPR – Commitment Period Reserve 
CPRS – Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (Australia) 
DPMC – Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 
ERU – Emissions Reduction Unit 
ETS – Emissions Trading Scheme 
EU – European Union 
EUETS – European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
GDP – Gross domestic product 
GGAS – Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme 
GHG – Greenhouse Gas 
HFCs – Hydrofluorocarbons  
IPCC – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
JI – Joint Implementation 
JVETS – Japan Voluntary Emissions Trading Scheme 
Kyoto gases – Carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons,   
 perfluorocarbons, sulphur hexafluoride 
Kyoto units – AAUs, CERs, RMUs, ERUs, lCERs, tCERs. 
lCER – long-term certified emissions reduction 
LULUCF – Land use, land use change and forestry 
MAF – Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
MED – Ministry of Economic Development 
MfE – Ministry for the Environment 
NGO – Non-governmental organisation 
NZETS – New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme 
NZEUR – New Zealand Emissions Unit Register 
NZU – New Zealand Unit 
PFCs – Perfluorocarbons 
RGGI – Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
RMU – Removal Unit 
tCER – Temporary certified emission reduction 
UNFCCC – United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
WCI – Western Climate Initiative 
